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1 Introduction 
The essence of resource management is determining the optimal rates of use and 
allocation of scarce resources. However, a problem arises in determining what optimality 
means. Often the resource management agency uses different criteria than other parties 
to define desirable outcomes. This paper concentrates on the problem of allocating 
resources in isolation from the problem of determining the rate of their use, to 
understand better the implications of choosing alternative resource allocation methods. 
The optimal methods for allocating scarce resources amongst potential users differ 
depending upon the objectives of the resource administering agency and the number and 
characteristics of those wishing to obtain rights over scarce resources. When resource 
control is held by commercial organisations it is typical to observe distribution of 
resources by any of a number of pricing tools, including fixed prices, discriminatory 
prices, and auctions. However, many resources administered by public agencies are 
distributed by mechanisms other than pricing. Social welfare and health services are 
often distributed on merit, and there is usually a well defined order for meeting demands; 
severe head injuries, for example, are likely to be treated before in-grown toenails. 
Other services are provided free of charge and without any other form of restriction (e.g. 
street lighting, access to national parks), while others are distributed by queuing (state 
housing), or lottery (hunting permits). Many resources previously allocated by public 
agencies using non-price methods have recently been, or may soon be, transferred to 
price allocation, either directly (e.g. the implementation of backcountry hut fees). or 
indirectly by entrusting distribution to commercial organisations or state-owned 
corporations (e.g. electricity supply to remote regions). 
The optimal allocation method is clearly dependent upon the objectives underlying supply 
of the service. For example, most people would consider it ludicrous to expect the poor 
to pay for social welfare services that they require only because of their poverty. While 
price allocation mechanisms can often be shown to meet efficiency goals, the reasons 
underlying provision of many of the goods and services administered by public agencies 
are not efficiency based. They are directed at distributional matters, often to meet some 
minimum standard, or to supply those services to which society considers individuals have 
a right. Hence, while it may in some narrow sense be efficient to allow the poor to 
starve, society does not condone this and actions are taken by public agencies to ensure 
that starvation does not occur. 
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The place of distributional matters in the ways society chooses to allocate resources is 
emphasised by Zajac (1978): 
"Governmental intrusion in the market place in the name of equity or 
social justice is widespread. Minimum wage and child labour laws, 
occupational and safety standards, environmental protection regulations, 
ceilings on interest rates for home mortgages are but a few examples. 
There are also obvious forces at work to make the phenomenon more 
widespread. The natural desire to right apparent wrongs creates pressures 
to pass laws and regulations to ensure justice is done. But the creation of 
a law or regulation in turn usually both interferes with the efficient 
operation of markets and creates a class of persons who gain. The gainers 
then of course fight any attempts to repeal the law or regulation"(p.1). 
Zajac's comments are directed at government regulation. They indicate that society is 
concerned about distributional matters and will go to great lengths to address perceived 
injustices. Regulations are not the only things to influence the actual distribution of 
resources and their benefits. Resource allocation tools cause dramatic variations in the 
allocation of goods and benefits. A lottery, for example, will result in different allocations 
to an English auction. This publication is about the impacts of resource allocation 
methods on both efficiency and distribution. 
Public agencies concerned with addressing distributional matters may be required to 
cover the costs of providing services from income received from their provision, and may 
also be concerned with matters of efficiency. Choice of a resource allocation tool will 
therefore need to be made in light of the relative revenue raising and efficiency 
characteristics of the tools available. These characteristics may act as constraints to 
adopting tools that best meet distributional objectives. 
In t~is publication methods available for distribution of goods and services are surveyed 
along with their implications for efficiency and equity. In doing so, the concentration is 
upon natural resources that are supplied by a monopolist (the public agency), with a 
quantity constraint. In everyday terms this assumption means that an agency has a fixed 
quantity of a natural resource to be allocated in a fixed period. For example, a regional 
authority may have a supply of aggregate suitable for concrete manufacture, the quantity 
being fixed by environmental constraints. 
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The quantity constraint may arise for many reasons, including: health, safety, ecological 
concerns, a variety of externalities, or congestion. The question of determining the 
optimal quantity of a resource to be allocated in any period is beyond the scope of this 
study and is not addressed here. Analysis of outcomes under conditions of congestion 
is somewhat different to the other cases, and so will not be addressed explicitly here, 
although many of the principles of rationing are also applicable to the congestion case. 
A framework for allocation decisions is presented by McCool and Utter (1981), and a 
modified version is presented in Figure 1.1. The quantity of the good or service to be 
allocated is determined exogenously, but the allocating agency must determine whether 
there is a case for predetermining the allocations to different categories of users. 
Whether or not the allocation agency or representatives of consumer groups allocate the 
good to individual users, there is a range of allocation techniques available. A choice of 
technique is unavoidable. The focus of this study is the impact of the broad classes of 
resource allocation techniques. 
The monopoly supply assumption does not greatly restrict applicability of the results 
derived. In many instances resources administered by agencies are not available from 
other sources, or the public agency takes a leading role in an oligopolistic market. 
Examples of resources that public agencies may have authority to distribute, and to which 
this analysis is consequently valid, include: real estate, securities, water, pollution rights, 
timber, grazing and other leases, gravel, minerals, access to cultural and educational 
facilities and services, health services, transport, housing, welfare grants, electricity, gas, 
acce'ss to reserves and recreation areas, recreation concession rights, roading, fish, game, 
and non-consumptive uses of wildlife. 
In many instances the resource administering agency will be a clear monopolist,often 
deriving its monopoly power from government statute. In a few cases (e.g. real estate) 
the public agency will have many options removed from it by the competition presented 
by other suppliers unless its product is sufficiently different from those offered by the 
competition. However, there is still a wide choice. Competition places upper limits on 
prices, but the agency may still wish to price discriminatively within those limits, or to 
allocate the resource using non-price methods. The presence of competitors will 
generally change the shape of the demand curve for the public agency product, and 
hence the prices attainable, but will not change the range of methods available for 
distribution of that product. 
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Yes 
Establish use limit 
Recognise categories 
of users 
Allot use between 
categories 
Agency makes 
individual allocations 
Techniques 
Figure 1.1 
Agents for category 
make individual allocations 
Techniques 
Framework for allocation decisions. 
Source: Adapted from McCool and Utter. 1981. 
4 
No 
All potential users 
follow same procedure 
Agency makes all 
individual allocations 
Techniques 
Most of the literature on pricing policy is directed at profit maximisation for commercial 
enterprises. Many aspects of the pricing decisions faced by commercial enterprises are 
not relevant to public agencies. Primary differences concern market structure and 
objectives. It is extremely rare to find commercial enterprises operating in a guaranteed 
monopoly situation, and even when they do their profit-making objectives are likely to 
be different to the objectives of a public agency with wider social concerns. Commercial 
enterprises employ pricing strategies to obtain market power and avoid taxes (e.g. 
predatory and transfer pricing) as well as to meet legal constraints that may be different 
to those faced by public agencies. 
A further major area of related study is the domain of antitrust economics. This area of 
research has important implications for some of the allocation methods studied here. It 
is primarily concerned with appropriate arrangements for pricing in industries showing 
decreasing marginal costs (increasing returns to scale). These industries are the 'natural 
monopolies' and are characterised by a large capital investment with low or zero unit 
costs of production. Examples include telecommunications and electricity distribution. 
The traditional efficient solution of setting price equal to marginal cost would result in 
financial losses to firms supplying these services. The antitrust literature has been 
concerned with identifying efficient methods of distributing these services that allow the 
supplying firms to make a 'fair' profit. This literature is the source of the two-part tariff 
and block pricing mechanisms. 
Several simplifying assumptions are retained throughout this analysis. Firstly, the more 
correct approach of general equilibrium analysis is forsaken for the more tractable partial 
equilibrium analysis. Under this approach, impacts of management of a particular good 
are assumed to affect only the consumers of that gOOd. Prices of other goods, and the 
benefits obtained from their consumption are assumed to be constant. This assumption 
is not a major problem as long as the expenditure on the goods being allocated by the 
public agency is only a small fraction of the purchasers' total budgets. Dropping this 
assumption would greatly increase the complexity of the analysis without greatly affecting 
the nature of the results. It is therefore unashamably retained for reasons of clarity. 
Monopoly supply of a fixed quantity of a homogeneous good is assumed throughout, and 
demand is greater than supply when there are no constraints on demand. Uncertainty 
over quantity and quality of the good and the rules under which it is to be managed are 
both precluded. Property rights to the goods to be allocated are assumed to be weU-
defined, and secure in the managing public agency. The aggregate demand functions for 
goods allocated by agencies are assumed to be known in many instances. The first 
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derivatives of individual (and hence aggregate) demand curves for these goods are 
assumed to be less than or equal to zero. 
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2 Management objectives 
Resource managers, amongst others, are involved in the process of determining what 
actions or outcomes are best. "Best" is usually interpreted to mean 'most socially 
desirable'. Adoption of this definition implies the need to specify the society of interest 
(e.g. a town, a region, a country, or subsets of people with interests in these), as well as 
the need to define social desirability. In some instances resource managers are provided 
with clear objectives for their management activities (e.g. maximise use, or maximise 
contribution to gross domestic product), al10wing them to act as technicians in 
determining optimal outcomes and implementing plans to obtain them. More often 
objectives are not weII specified and the resource manager acts as a conduit for 
information to others who determine socially desirable outcomes or actions and may then 
charge the resource manager with implementing their decisions. 
The objectives for resource management in New Zealand are currently in a state of flux. 
The Royal Commission on Social Policy (1988, p.24) recommended "The adoption of an 
integrated and co-ordinated policy approach, with a better and more humane balance 
between economic and social policy considerations than has occurred in the past. 
However, overall goals for society must be identified first, so that efficiency and 
distributional objectives can be specified." Those responsible for the Resource 
Management Law Reform have also recognised this problem "Above all, the law reform 
has recognised the need to identify and articulate the objectives of resource management 
.... In their management plans, decision makers will be expected to justify their selection 
of management tools, and to assess the intended effect (including the environmental 
impacts) of what is proposed." (Ministry for the Environment, 1989, p.8). 
Since, "[sJtates cannot be socially ordered without someone making prior value 
judgements .. , [andJ value judgements are statements of ethics which cannot be found to 
be true or false on the basis of factual evidence" (Boadway and Bruce, 1984, p.137) a 
problem arises when determining what information is needed to rank alternatives. The 
type of information the resource manager will need to supply depends upon the elements 
of the decision maker's objective function. Knowledge of those elements avoids provision 
of information that will not be used. Commonly suggested elements of social objective 
functions include efficiency, equity, and liberty. This list may not be complete. The 
resource manager whose role is simply to supply information to decision makers does not 
need to know the form of the social objective function, just its elements. Knowing that 
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efficiency, equity and liberty may all be relevant does not solve the resource manager's 
problems, however, as there remain the problems of defining each of these concepts and 
measuring them. 
Social decision rules rank alternatives for their social desirability. In many instances these 
rules are not able to identify the most socially desirable outcome or action, but simply rank 
(a subset of) outcomes or actions. Many social decision rules have been suggested that 
focus on a subset of the objective set listed above. A brief survey of some of the more 
common of these follows. 
21 Efficiency 
The least contested social decision rule is that of Vilfredo Pareto, which requires that no 
individual be made worse-off by implementing any proposed change and at least one 
individual is made better-off. In this case the proposed change is 'Pareto superior' to the 
status quo. When no Pareto superior state exists the situation is termed Pareto efficient, 
or Pareto optimal. The Pareto principle appears rather innocuous, but it is not devoid 
of value judgement since it relies upon the judgement that "social decisions be based 
exclusively upon individual preferences" (Russell and Wilkinson, 1979, p.400), and the 
judgement that everyone's preferences count (including those of the insane, criminals, 
and others whose preferences are currently ignored by society). 
Pareto efficiency is determined by the initial distribution of goods or utility. If the initial 
distribution is unacceptable the Pareto principle is unable to provide guidance about 
desirable states, and "the choice of income distribution ... is a political matter that can 
be solved only by value judgements through the political process" (Just et al., 1982, p.ll). 
It could be claimed that efficiency and distribution are separate matters, but "one cannot 
solve the problem of efficiency and distribution in two stages by first maximising the value 
of the social product by correctly allocating resources and then distributing the product 
equitably. The relative value of products depends on income distribution, which depends, 
in turn, on factor ownership" (Just et al., 1982, p.29). 
The Paretian definition of efficiency is limited in that a Pareto efficient state is not 
necessarily Pareto superior to states that are not Pareto efficient. Further, there is no 
way of judging between the many possible Pareto efficient states (or between non-
efficient states). Since most actions entail negative impacts on some people, the concept 
of Pareto efficiency is often unable to guide decision makers. 
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The Pareto principle's inability to rank many proposals has resulted in the adoption of 
decision-making criteria that allow the possibility that some people are made worse-off. 
Principal amongst these is the potential Pareto improvement, or compensation, criterion. 
This criterion labels proposals socially beneficial if the gainers could compensate the 
losers and still be made better-off by the proposed change whether compensation is made 
or not. 
The Pareto criterion implicitly recognises that individuals have a right to at least their 
status quo level of utility (or income, or consumption). The compensation criterion 
recognises no such right. Adopting it has the potential to make the poor both relatively 
and absolutely worse-off, and therefore exacerbate inequalities (Sen, 1973). Cost benefit 
analysis is a method for testing the potential Pareto improvement criterion using specific 
definitions of welfare. 
The compensation criterion is one version of utilitarianism, which is defined by Sen (1986, 
p.278) to have three elements: 
(1) Consequentialism: The rightness of actions - and (more generally) of the choice 
of all control variables - must be judged entirely by'the goodness of the consequent 
state of affairs. 
(2) Welfarism: The goodness of states of affairs must be judged entirely by the 
goodness of the set of individual utilities in the respective states of affairs. 
(3) Sum-ranking: The goodness of any set of individual utilities must be judged 
entirely by their sum total. 
Sen (1986, p.278) claims that each of the features of utilitarianism "remain eminently 
controversial, and rival theories of morality have argued for the replacement of one or 
more of these features". 
Criticisms of utilitarianism are based on ethical concerns and practical concerns. The 
latter are raised by the need to make interpersonal utility comparisons. However, there 
is no theoretically defensible way of making interpersonal comparisons of welfare 
(Friedman, 1985, p.38). 
As Blackorby and Donaldson (1977) point out, utilitarianism concentrates solely on total 
utility and completely ignores distribution of utility. The implications of adopting a 
utilitarian criterion for resource allocation will be unacceptable for many. For example, 
under this decision rule it is acceptable to commit crimes as long as the benefits to the 
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criminals outweigh the costs imposed upon the victims. In some cases there is partial 
support for such practices, as epitomised by the legend of Robin Hood. However, in 
other cases, such as gang rape or murder, very few people would be willing to endorse 
the actions of the criminals. The total of net individual benefits is not everything. 
Society is concerned about the distribution of impacts under varying states of the world. 
2.1.1 Cost recovery 
A common judgement on distributional fairness is that beneficiaries should fund projects. 
In essence this is often a means of applying the Pareto criterion where efficiency is 
determined with respect to willingness to pay. Cost recovery for changes in provision of 
goods (but not for existing provision) ensures Pareto superiority, but not Pareto 
efficiency; Pareto superiority is a necessary but not sufficient condition for obtaining 
Pareto optimality. That cost recovery is not applied to all activities where it is practical 
(examples include many health, police, and social welfare services) indicates that 
efficiency concerns are not always paramount in this country. 
22 Equity 
Ethical concerns arise over a variety of issues including liberty, justice, and equality. 
They may be classified into two major areas, outcome equity and process equity 
(Friedman, 1985). The former is concerned with the equity of the distribution of goods 
or welfare that a~tually occurs. It is not ~oncerned with why the distribution has come 
about. On the other hand, process equity is not concerned with final distributions, but 
is concerned with the equity of initial distributions and the equity of processes under 
which distributions change. 
It is not appropriate to investigate fully theories of distributional morality here. A brief 
summary of some of the main schools of thought follows. Concepts of equity and 
efficiency can be defined in terms of goods, utility, income, or opportunity. The range 
of possibilities should be borne in mind throughout the ensuing discussion. 
2.2.1 Outcome equity 
Utilitarianism is a special case of this class of equity issues. It is concerned with the final 
allocation of things because of the consequentialism feature. Utilitarianism forms a polar 
case in excluding any concern for distributional matters and concentrating on total utility. 
Opposed to this view of the world is another form of outcome ethic in Rawls' (1971) 
theory of justice, which ignores totals completely. Rawls proposed that social welfare 
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should be determined solely by the utility of the least well-off member of society. A 
modified version of Rawls' maxi-min criterion is the lexi-min criterion, which considers 
the welfare of other members of society to settle ties on the maxi-min criterion. 
(i) Equality as a basis for equity 
One measure of outcome equity is equality. The more alike the allocations of goods (or 
whatever) are to all individuals, the more fair the distribution. This view of the world is 
often termed egalitarianism. A somewhat less rigid form is specific egalitarianism, which 
is "the view that certain specific scarce commodities should be distributed less unequally 
than the ability to pay for them" (Tobin, 1970, p.448). Two main arguments support 
specific egalitarianism as an important goal in public policy. The first is the intuitive 
notion that it is inherently wrong that some people should have "less than a minimum 
of decency in terms of income, education, health care, or other basic needs," and the 
second is the observation that "an inequitable society is highly unlikely to function 
smoothly" (Nagel, 1984, p.86). 
The limiting case of egalitarianism arises when all individuals receive the same allocation. 
Suppose goods were distributed equally among all people. If such an initial allocation 
is deemed "fair" there still remains a problem regarding the evaluation of other 
outcomes. If such a distribution was made, the differing tastes of individuals would imply 
that utilities are not equal. Some people are better-off than others. Immediately society 
is faced with the issue of determining whether it is concerned for equality of goods or 
equality of welfare. An alternative approach is to allocate goods to equate utilities of 
individuals. Such a proposal requires the interpersonal comparison of utilities, which is 
not possible. 
Differences in tastes imply that an equal distribution of goods will not be stable. 
Individuals may make themselves better-off by engaging in trade, resulting in a non-equal 
distribution. There is no basis for judging the equity of this final outcome. Even if 
perfect markets exist and trade results in improvements to the welfare of some 
individuals without making anyone worse-off, it is unclear how to trade-off the increased 
efficiency with the (possible) increased inequity. 
Egalitarianism is criticised for two main reasons, its perversion of incentives and the 
belief that society prefers unequal outcomes. On the former, Milton and Rose Friedman 
question "what incentive is there to work and produce?" (Friedman and Friedman, 1980, 
p.167). Since everyone obtains the same outcome, there is no incentive to work, let 
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alone work hard or in an occupation that takes years of training. Consequently, total 
output is likely to be very low, reducing both total and individual welfare levels. 
While Kneese (1977, p.21) claims western liberal societies "usually regard ourselves as 
striving for an egalitarian society, the main obstacle being the possible effects on 
incentives of extreme redistribution measures," Tobin (1970, p.448) takes the view that 
"Americans commonly perceive differences in wealth and income as earned and regard 
the differential earnings of effort, skill, foresight, and enterprise as deserved." Friedman 
and Friedman (1980) cite the preponderance for gambling in many societies and the 
unwillingness of most of the population to join communes or kibbutz as evidence that 
people often seek, or prefer, unequal outcomes. The divergent views of social 
commentators with regard to societies' acceptance of egalitarianism as a desirable 
outcome indicates that choice of an appropriate social welfare ordering is likely to entail 
some value judgement about the importance of equality of the distribution of goods or 
utility, and any such judgement is likely to be controversial. 
(ii) Envy as a basis for equity 
Another basis for determining outcome equity is enry, or more correctly - lack of envy. 
Under this view of the world an outcome is fair if no individual envies the consumption 
bundle possessed by any other individual (see Feldman, 1980, and especially Baumol, 
1986, for discussion of this concept). The equal distribution of goods is therefore fair 
under this criterion. The concept is appealing in that it does not rely on inter-personal 
comparisons of utility. However, starting from an equal distribution (or any other envy-
free distribution), trade may bring about distributions that are not considered fair 
(Feldman, 1980; Baumol, 1986), bringing the concept of fairness into conflict with Pareto 
efficiency, and "since that principle is too reasonable to abandon, this concept of equity 
is seriously undermined" (Boadway and Bruce, 1984, p.174). 
This concept of equity may be criticised on the same grounds of lack of incentives and 
non-desirability as is egalitarianism. For example: 
"it is questionable whether the concept of lack of envy adequately captures 
the notion of fairness. One can think of cases where someone prefers the 
consumption bundle of someone else, yet everyone might agree that the 
economy is fair in the sense of being equitable. For example, I might envy 
a friend's 'lucky find' in an antique store yet perceive no 'unfairness' in the 
fact that he, not I, owns it" (Boadway and Bruce, 1984, pp.174-175). 
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(iii) A general concept of outcome equity 
Both the Rawls criterion and utilitarianism are complete, meaning they can order all 
possible social states. Some decision rules are only able to order a sub-set of social states 
and are termed quasi-orderings. The most common quasi-ordering is the Pareto 
criterion. There are several quasi-orderings that attempt to trade-off efficiency and 
equity, examples are provided by the dominance, hull-of-dominance, modified Rawls, 
egalitarian hull, and other criteria (see Russell and Wilkinson, 1979, Sen, 1986, Blackorby 
and Donaldson, 1977, for descriptions of some of these). The most general formulation 
of a social welfare function that trades-off efficiency and outcome equity is the Bergson-
Samuelson social welfare function (see, for example, Russell and Wilkinson, 1979; Just 
et al., 1982). This approach maps a utility possibilities frontier in inter-personal utility 
space, and determines socially optimal outcomes by overlaying a set of social indifference 
curves. Such a social welfare ordering may be expressed mathematically as: 
W(x) = F(u1(x), u\x), ... ,uh(x)) 
where: ui(x) is the utility derived by individual i from distribution x, and 
W(x) is the social welfare of distribution x. 
A generalised expression for utilitarian social welfare functions with isoelastic indifference 
curves is (Boadway and Bruce, 1984): 
H 
W = [l: (Uhy-T] / (1-.,.) 
h=l 
where: uh is the utility level of household h, and 
.,.-1 is the elasticity of substitution of the indifference contours. 
When .,. = 0 this expression reduces to the utilitarian case, whereas the Rawlsian case is 
derived as T approaches infinity. 
This general approach fails because of the lack of agreement on the correct specification 
of the social indifference curvesl (selection of the function F, or acceptance of 
1 Kenneth Arrow first showed, in his oft-cited impossibility theorem, that neither this approach 
nor any other is able to provide a ranking of states of the world based upon individual 
preferences, and is consistent with some reasonable constraints that such a procedure would 
be required to satisfy. See KJ. Arrow, Social choice and individual values. John Wiley and 
Sons, New York, 1951. 
13 
utilitarianism and selection of the parameter 'f), it is also unable to account for matters 
of process equity. 
2.2.2 Process equity 
Those concerned primarily with process equity are not concerned that allocations of 
goods or utility, per se, are unequal as long as the procedures under which the goods were 
obtained were fair. Differences in wealth or utility may have arisen because of hard work 
on the part of some individuals (and lack of it on behalf of others), or because some 
individuals were denied opportunities to participate in the workforce, or to obtain the 
skills necessary to do so. In these cases equality of outcomes may be considered unfair. 
Sen (1986, p.282) puts it this way, "it is possible to defend a person's rights not in terms 
of the goodness of its [sic J consequences, but on the grounds that these rights have 
intrinsic moral acceptability irrespective of the consequences of the exercise of these 
rights" and proceeds to cite Nozick (1974, p.166): "Rights do not determine the position 
of an alternative or the relative position of two alternatives in a social ordering; they 
operate upon a social ordering to constrain the choice it can yield." 
The principal notion of process equity is the concept of equal opportunity. For example, 
it may be considered unfair that some individuals are disadvantaged because of gender 
or race (say in their ability to obtain finance or education), resulting in diminished 
welfare for the same amount of work as others. Policies that redistribute benefits toward 
the disadvantaged groups may then be considered advantageous. More contentious are 
concepts of equality of opportunity in terms of genetic characteristics and inheritance. 
Some authors claim that it is unfair that individuals can expect to obtain high utility levels 
simply because they are fortunate enough to be born into a wealthy family, or because 
they are an intellectual or sporting genius, while others are certain only of misery because 
of the circumstances of their births (Boadway and Bruce, 1984, p.176). 
The concept of process equity includes the rules for acquiring and transferring rights to 
goods. These rules provide the only means to obtain rights, and also provide a guarantee 
of obtaining a right if satisfied. Examples of such rules are provided by Locke (1690) 
and, more recently, by Nozick (1974). Sen (1986, p.285) notes that these rules have been 
widely criticised for the arbitrariness of the principles upon which they are based. The 
same criticism must also apply to all other notions of distributional fairness. 
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2.3 The role of the analyst 
Resource management requires inputs from two parties: the decision maker, who 
determines what is socially desirable; and the analyst, who provides information to the 
decision maker. Of course, it is possible that these are the same person or group. The 
decision maker is required to process information, provided by the analyst, related to 
often complex concepts that bear upon the objectives of resource management. These 
concepts must attain the same meaning for both parties if they are to be of use in the 
resource management process. They must be well defined and measured in a manner 
that is understood and applicable by both parties. 
Given that "in popular discourses fairness is an amalgam of a multiplicity of ad hoc 
desiderata that no simple and analytically tractable formulation may be able to capture" 
(Baumol, 1986, p.ll), and "no unique concept of equity is widely regarded as definitive 
for public policy making" (Friedman, 1984, pAD) it is not possible for the analyst to 
determine "the best" action or policy. Indeed, it appears that society may not apply the 
same criteria to all things. For example, many societies appear to emphasise strict 
egalitarianism in allocating one vote per adult and taking considerable effort to prevent 
trade in votes, while specific egalitarianism is emphasised by the same society in providing 
a minimum standard of health care for all. Equality of opportunity is emphasised in the 
concept of free and compulsory education, whereas liberty and the Pareto improvement 
criterion appear to guide allocation of most goods and services judged to be non-
essentials. Somewhere in the decision-making process some person, or group, must make 
a value judgement about social morality with respect to target variables and their 
distribution. If the bases for these decisions are conveyed to analysts, they will then be 
able to provide only the information relevant to the decision. 
Most analysts treat the Pareto principle as a generally accepted moral principle. 
However, to go beyond this principle increasingly controversial moral judgements must 
be made. Boadway and Bruce (1984) summarise: 
"a complete and non-dictatorial welfaristic social ordering will require 
interhousehold utility level comparisons at the very least. Even stronger 
utility comparisons must be made to obtain a richer menu of social welfare 
ordering possibilities. In any event, to go beyond the Pareto principle we 
must invoke additional and stronger ethical postulates"(p.17D). 
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If decision makers are unwilling to make their views on distributive morality public, either 
through political expediency or ignorance, the analyst can best assist decision making by 
providing information on both efficiency and equity. Given that the analyst is unable to 
predict the variables of concern to the decision maker, the best that can be done is to 
provide summary measures of efficiency and equity, supported with a description of 
impacts by categories of those experiencing the impact. Friedman (1984) reaches the 
same conclusion: 
"The diversity of specific concepts of efficiency and equity should receive 
attention. Given the lack of any predetermined social consensus about 
which of them to apply and how to integrate those that do apply, policy 
analysis can usually best help users reach informed normative conclusions 
by clearly laying out its predictions and evaluating them by the different 
normative elements (e.g., efficiency, relative efficiency, equality, equal 
opportunity). Certainly, nontechnical users will find each of the elements 
more familiar or at least easier to understand than the concept of a social 
welfare function" (pA 7). 
Friedman's guidelines for the information that should be supplied by the policy analyst 
should perhaps be clarified. Relative efficiency is based upon the existing distribution of 
entitlements, and is concerned with identifying whether one proposal is more efficient 
than the others, in the potential Pareto sense. Absolute efficiency is also based upon the 
existing distribution of entitlements, but seeks to identify policies yielding Pareto optima, 
rather than simply the Pareto superior alternatives identified by relative efficiency. 
Friedman claims the two most important measures of outcome equity are the minimum 
standard (specific egalitarianism) and equality. He suggests that the former may be 
measured as a percentage of those failing to attain the minimum standard. The latter 
may be measured by either the Gini coefficient or the coefficient of variation. No 
measurement of process equity is proposed. 
Atkinson (1970) and Sen (1973) discuss a wide range of measures of equality, including 
those proposed by Friedman. Atkinson concludes that: 
"a complete ranking of distributions cannot be reached without fully 
specifying the form of the social welfare function ... examination of the 
social welfare functions implicit in these measures shows that in a number 
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of cases they have properties which are unlikely to be acceptable, and in 
general there are no grounds for believing that they would accord with 
social values" (p.262). 
Summary measures of efficiency and equity are not free of value judgements, leading to 
the conclusion that, in the absence of detailed information on the social desirability of 
relevant states, the best that the analyst can do is to provide a description of the impacts 
experienced by individuals and groups, and/or supply summary measures while taking 
care to indicate the value judgements implicit in their adoption. 
Information should address questions such as: how are different social/user groups 
affected, and by how much? Only in this way does the decision maker have sufficient 
information to determine whether the efficiency gains (or losses) of a particular action 
are sufficient to offset the distributional impacts. Of course, the analyst cannot be 
expected to perform these tasks in a vacuum. It is impractical to describe the impacts 
of most resource management proposals on every affected individual, implying the need 
to categorise individuals. The aid of the decision maker will be necessary in identifying 
relevant groupings. Typical groups are often defined on grounds of: socio-economic 
status, income, race, sex, gender, nationality, household structure, age, employment status, 
or on other variables related to the issue in question. 
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3 Resource allocation tools 
A variety of resource allocation tools is available to resource managers. At the limits are 
the options of doing nothing and completely precluding access to resources. We assume 
that the management agency wishes to allow some use of a natural resource, but less 
than would occur if no action is taken and consumers are free to consume as much as 
they desire. Hence, while admitting that the polar cases are applicable management 
options in some circumstances we have no interest in investigating them further here. 
Shubik (1970) identifies eight major means of resource allocation: 
(1) economic markets with prices 
(2) voting 
(3) bidding 
( 4) bargaining 
(5) higher authority, fiat, or dictatorship 
(6) force, fraud, deceit 
(7) custom, including gifts and inheritance 
(8) chance. 
Not all elements of Shubik's typology are appropriate to public agency resource 
allocation. The options of voting (2), force, fraud, and deceit (6), and custom (7) are not 
investigated here, even though they are extremely common methods of resource 
allocation in other contexts. Allocation methods are divided into two major categories: 
market and non-market allocation tools. Market tools are characterised by agreement 
between trading partners about the amount of one good to be exchanged for another. 
Typically we encounter markets where goods are exchanged for currency (retailing, 
auctions), however, the medium of exchange need not be money. An important class of 
markets where money need not be exchanged is provided by those cases where goods are 
rationed by coupon or voucher. Usually, but not always, the voucher price of the good 
is determined by the agency issuing the coupons. 
18 
3.1 Market allocation tools 
3.1.1 Uniform prices 
A monopolistic agency may choose to allocate scarce goods by setting a single, market 
clearing, money price, allowing everyone to consume ?s much as they desire at that price. 
In terms of Figure 3.1, price must be set at Po so that the allowable quantity Qo is 
consumed. Po is often termed the competitive price, because it is the price that would 
occur in a competitive market. While this term is used throughout this publication, the 
reader should recall that the market is not competitive, but the monopolist may choose 
to act as if it was competitive. Profit-maximising monopolists would never act in this way, 
since they can (usually) increase their profits by charging a higher price. Competitive 
pricing earns revenue P oQo for the monopolist. 
If the market demand curve, l which is the consumers' marginal benefit function, is 
known with certainty, the market clearing price (Po) may be chosen and the desired 
quantity (Qo) sold. However, at best, demand is uncertain, and for environmental 
commodities, is often completely unknown. By choosing a price not equal to Po demand 
will vary from the fixed supply, 0 0, If the quantity constraint is strongly binding (for 
example, there are no more trees to fell) it is impossible for Qo to be exceeded. In this 
case demand is unsatisfied and the management agency will still need to ration the 
resource (say via queuing) and forsake revenue to the benefit of those successful in 
obtaining access to the resource. If the quantity constraint is not strong, resource use will 
exceed the desired level. 
If a price greater than Po is chosen demand will be less than Qo and resource users will 
be disadvantaged since net benefit per unit consumed is less than at price Po, and fewer 
units are consumed. The revenue implications for the rationing agency are uncertain, 
depending upon the elasticity of demand. If marginal revenue is greater than zero 
(greater than marginal cost when costs of provision are positive) at 0 0, selecting a price 
higher than Po will decrease agency income. 
When value is measured by willingness to pay, the market clearing price is known with 
certainty, and markets operate perfectly, uniform pricing is an efficient means of 
allocating a fixed quantity of a resource, since all those willing to pay at least the market 
clearing price obtain access to use, while those willing to pay-less than this fail to obtain 
1 This analysis is developed in terms of ordinary, or Marshallian, demand curves. It could 
just as easily have been developed in terms of the Hicksian compensating or equivalent 
demand curves. See Just et al. (1982) for explanation of these concepts. 
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access. In other words, no-one who fails to obtain access to the good has a greater 
willingness to pay than anyone who does obtain access. When benefits are measured by 
willingness to pay, pricing has the advantage of providing a measure of the value of 
additional capacity. 
Pricing may not be a feasible means of allocating some natural resources because of the 
inability to exclude non-payers from using the resource. Access to national parks and 
state forests are likely cases. Of course, this criticism applies equally to other methods, 
such as lotteries and reservations, but not to all (e.g. effort). A notable exception in New 
Zealand parks is provided by commercially operated guided tramping where capacity is 
limited by the terms of the concession. The ready identification of those who have paid 
allows these operations to charge prices that limit demand to capacity. 
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The main distributional justice concerns are that pncmg discriminates not only on 
grounds of willingness to pay, but also on grounds of ability to pay, and also the fairness 
of recovering costs of provision. The first concern is an expression that either (i) 
consumers' surplus does not provide a relevant measure of benefits, or (ii) the existing 
pattern of wealth distribution is inappropriate. These two arguments are not identical 
- in some cases (ii) implies (i), but consumers' surplus may be judged to be an 
inappropriate measure of benefits even when wealth is optimally distributed. Costs of 
providing existing units may be sunk, and therefore of little consequence. However, if 
future provision is costly and is paid for out of taxes or rates, those obtaining use at less 
than the cost of provision are being subsidised by other members of society. The fairness 
of such a policy cannot be determined a priori. It may be deemed unfair for luxury 
goods, such as yachts, while totally appropriate for others, such as non-cosmetic surgery. 
The area PoAB in Figure 3.1 is termed Marshallian consumers' surplus and provides a 
measure of the benefits accruing to consumers of the rationed good. Monopolists and 
others possessing market power commonly attempt to obtain a share of these benefits 
by adopting a variety of discriminatory pricing practices. 
3.1.2 Discriminatory pricing 
Discriminatory pricing is a term used to describe a variety of techniques that firms with 
some market power are able to apply to appropriate some of the consumer surplus to 
which uniform pricing does not give them access. This is done by charging different 
prices for different people purchasing identical goods, the price charged being dependent 
. upon the individual's demand characteristics. Typical examples include: student and 
senior citizen discounts, season tickets, tied purchases, peak-load pricing, connection fees, 
quantity discounts, and minimum hire requirements. 
The best a monopolist can do is to appropriate all the consumer surplus with what is 
commonly referred to as perfect, or first degree, price discrimination. Consumers are 
charged their maximum willingness to pay for each unit of the good purchased. 
Implementing such a policy requires that the seller has perfect knowledge of each 
consumer's demand curve. Most authors assert that the transaction costs involved in 
obtaining this information would be enormous, making perfect discrimination a 
theoretical fantasy. However, it may be possible to approach perfect discrimination in 
some industries, as indicated by Phlips' (1983) example of railways charging different 
freight rates for the same goods going to different end uses. 
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While first degree price discrimination is uncommon, the same cannot be said for second 
or third degree discrimination. Second degree discrimination involves charging varying 
unit prices for the same good. For example, the price per marginal unit of electricity 
may fall after a given number of units has been purchased. Advanced schemes may 
include numerous steps, or price blocks. By charging more for infra-marginal units the 
seller appropriates some of the consumer surplus, but not all of it. Phlips (1983) likens 
this to a tax on infra-marginal units equal to the difference in marginal and unit prices. 
Third-degree discrimination requires that there exist groups of buyers with differing price 
elasticities of demand. By setting a price for each group so that marginal revenues for 
all groups are equated, the monopolist maximises profits. This type of discrimination is 
often the main reason for student and pensioner discounts. 
Price discrimination is particularly important in the field of natural monopolies 
(increasing returns to scale), where marginal costs of production continue to decrease 
with increased output, and average cost is greater than average revenue for all quantities 
produced. Without price discrimination such an industry will never be viable, however, 
it may be possible to earn some profit by discriminating, allowing the needs of consumers 
to be met and improving the welfare of producers and consumers, even those 
'discriminated against'. 
Pre-requisites for application of discriminatory pricing are market power, the ability to 
distinguish members of the various groups, knowledge of their demand characteristics, 
and the ability to preclude trade in the commodity between groups. Friedman (1985, 
p.315) indicates that two main groups of commodities satisfy these conditions well. They 
are services and utilities, both of which are commonly provided by public agencies. 
Services include such things as health care, legal advice, accounting, taxi rides, restaurant 
meals, and automobile servicing. Utilities include telephone, electricity, gas, and water. 
Public agencies therefore have considerable scope for implementing discriminatory 
pricing practices, and often do so, implementing policies that charge different prices (for 
example) for business and domestic consumers of electricity and telecommunications. 
3.1.3 Vouchers 
Prices may be set in terms of money, or some other form of currency, which mayor may 
not be exchangeable for money. Such other currencies are usually termed ration 
coupons, permits, or vouchers, and have commonly been used to ration foodstuffs and 
other basic requirements during wartime. Vouchers may be directly redeemable for 
goods, or may also require money transactions. Demand for the rationed commodities 
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is restricted by the number of vouchers allocated. Distributional and efficiency impacts 
of vouchers are determined by their method of initial distribution and whether trade in 
vouchers is permitted. A white market occurs when trade in vouchers is permitted, while 
restrictions on trade often result in illegal trading (black markets) as individuals attempt 
to appropriate the gains to be made from transferring vouchers from low to high value 
recipients. 
3.1.4 Auctions 
Auctions require the exchange of money for rationed goods, but the exchange price is not 
predetermined. Price is determined at the time of sale by bidding. Bids are offers to buy 
at stated prices. Cassady (1967) describes the main types of auction mechanisms used 
worldwide. These include the English, Dutch, and simultaneous auctions. Many other 
forms of auction exist, but they are essentially variations on one or more of the three 
main types . 
. (i) English auction 
The English auction is the variety most common to New Zealanders. Buyers make bids 
for the goode s) on offer. The last bid made is termed the current bid. Only bids greater 
than the current bid are accepted. When the point is reached that no-one is willing to 
bid more than the current bid the goods are sold, at the price bid, to the person who 
made the current bid. The end of bidding is signalled by the auctioneer, or by the 
passage of a predetermined amount of time (often the time taken for a candle to burn). 
In cases where multiple items are being sold (e.g. cases of fruit) the successful bidder 
may have the option of taking only part of the consignment, the rest being offered to 
other purchasers at the same price, or re-auctioned. 
(ii) Dutch auction 
The Dutch auction is a descending price auction. The seller nominates a price that 
purchasers are able to accept (typically by calling out "mine," leading to the alternative 
name of mining for this type of auction). If the offer is not accepted within a pre-
specified unit of time the price is reduced. This procedure continues until the first 
person accepts an offer, at which time the auction ends, the goods being sold to the 
acceptor at the current price. A common variation is to constantly reduce prices that are 
indicated on the face of a large clock which 'counts prices down'. Alternatively, the clock 
marks the passage of time with prices being adjusted as each mark on the clock face is 
passed. 
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(iii) Simultaneous bid auctions 
The English and Dutch auctions are characterised by successive bids, only one bid being 
current. Simultaneous bid auctions allow more than one bid to be made, often in 
secrecy, and rely upon the auctioneer to determine who made the highest bid. Bids may 
be made with simultaneous hand signals, by electronic means, be whispered to the 
auctioneer, or be submitted in written form. The latter approach is commonly known as 
tendering. 
(iv) Discussion 
Variations on the basic forms of auction are numerous, and present a vast array of 
combinations for comparative analysis. A major dichotomy occurs between the 
discriminative and competitive auction rules. Under the former, each successful offer in 
a multi-good auction is accepted at the price offered, while in the latter the nominated 
bids determine who obtains access to the goods, but price is determined by the lowest 
accepted (or highest rejected) bid, and is the same for all. 
Clearly, this dichotomy is only of importance where there is more than one unit of a good 
to be disposed of, say thousands of cases of fish. In many instances the auction is used 
to dispose of a single, unique good, works of art, antiques, and real estate providing 
typical examples. In this case price may be determined by either the highest or second 
highest bids. These are known as first and second price auctions respectively. In either 
case the item is obtained by the person bidding the highest. 
Bidding behaviour is affected markedly by the rules set for the auction, as each bidder 
attempts to adopt a strategy that maximises their individual benefits. It is not in the 
individual's interest to reveal their demand function, since the auction is a strategic game 
with uncertainty arising over the value of the good to opposing bidders. Different forms 
of auction are known to result in different expected prices, and consequently different 
expected benefits to sellers and buyers. In general there can be no guarantee that those 
with the highest willingness to pay will obtain access to the good(s) being auctioned, 
implying that auctions are not necessarily efficient. Much effort has been expended to 
determine the relative benefits of alternative auction formats without coming to any firm 
conclusions. What is known is that auctions are of use where there is uncertainty. If the 
seller knew buyer demand functions it would be possible to use discriminatory pricing 
schemes to obtain a better return than could be obtained from disposing of the same 
goods by auction. 
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3.2 Non-market allocation tools 
3.2.1 Lottery 
The lottery is a method of allocation by chance. In simple lotteries all participants have 
an equal probability of success, however it is possible to apportion successes amongst 
different categories of participants to alter the probability of success for the different 
categories. In its simplest form, all those wishing to consume the rationed good have 
their names recorded and at some predetermined time names are drawn randomly to 
determine successful applicants. Pure lotteries are open to all and are free of any 
qualifying conditions or fees. Impure lotteries may require that applicants meet some 
merit requirement, queue for the limited number of ballots, or pay fees for entering or 
success in the lottery. 
Lotteries are impartial and therefore are often viewed as being "eminently fair" (Hardin, 
1969). They are relatively simple for consumers to partake in, but impose high 
transaction costs on managers to ensure all applicants are included in the draw, duplicate 
applications are not included, and all applicants are advised of the outcome. The 
uncertainty of outcomes may induce individuals to enter many lotteries simultaneously, 
when they are only able to benefit from one "win." This and the long lead times 
required.to administer a lottery result in a large proportion of "no-shows" - people who 
are successful in a lottery but who do not exercise their rights to consume the rationed 
good. 
The no-show problem may be dealt with by increasing the number of successes in the 
lottery to obtain the same expected number of users, or by allocating no-shows on the 
day by some other method, such as queuing or pricing. The former approach is suitable 
for allocating services or goods where the quantity constraint is not strictly binding in the 
short-term. An example is provided by outdoor recreation areas where use is limited 
because of the ecological impacts of the total amount of use, and where the amount of 
use in anyone day (for example) may not be critical. This approach clearly does not 
work for other goods where the quantity constraint is strongly binding, such as access to 
a hunting block where safety and non-disturbance of game are prime concerns, and 
alternative allocation mechanisms would have to be adopted to deal with no-shows. 
Lotteries in their pure form do not capture rent for the resource administering agency. 
However, the imposition of entry or success fees allows some rent to be captured. 
Because lottery winners are chosen at random, without any reference to intensity of 
preferences, some highly desirable potential resource users may be tempted to use the 
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resource despite their exclusion by the lottery. The lottery "maximises the incentive for 
the unlucky to flout the allocation process. Enforcement may be a problem for this 
device" (Cullen, 1985, p.13). 
Because "a lottery would not discriminate among users according to the relative value 
they place on the [resource,] persons who entered the lottery frivolously or to whom [the 
resource] is relatively unimportant would hold the same chance of winning as the ... 
enthusiast" (Stankey and Baden, 1977, p.7), leading to the conclusion that the lottery will 
be inefficient however value is defined. 
3.2.2 Reservation 
Reservation is a commonly used tool (in association with price) for allocating 
accommodation and travel and (without pricing) hunting blocks. The first person to 
request consumption of a given unit of the good is allocated that unit. By reserving far 
enough into the future one may (almost) be guaranteed to obtain the rationed good. 
Several authors (e.g. Shelby and Danley, 1979; Stankey and Baden, 1977) have 
questioned the fairness of such a system that favours those with long planning horizons. 
This is the main reason that in many cases where the reservation method is used not all 
units of the rationed good are allocated by this method. To meet better the needs of 
those who are unable to plan long-term some units may be allocated by pricing or 
queuing at the time of use. An example is air travel. By reserving early it is possible to 
obtain low priced seats, while some seats are retained to satisfy the demands of urgent, 
short-notice travellers who are required to pay more for them. 
3.2.3 Queues 
Queues are similar to pricing in that they impose a time price for use of a resource. 
Reservations are an application of the first-come, first-served principle prior to the time 
of use, and often remote from the physical location of the good. Reservations can result 
in instant confirmation of future use for the user. Queuing, on the other hand, is first-
come, first-served at the time of use, usually at the physical location of the good. Queues 
therefore eliminate the problem of no-shows at the cost to consumers of increased 
uncertainty .. Queues may be either physical or paper. The person who has been waiting 
the longest obtains the next unit of the good to be distributed. 
It is often argued that because everyone is equally endowed with time queuing is the 
fairest means of resource allocation. Fairness only comes at the cost of inefficiency 
however, as time spent queuing (and travel costs for physical queues) is wasted, those 
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who obtain access to the resource do so by paying with their time, however those who 
do not obtain access also pay. Further, the marginal value of time is not the same for 
all individuals. Those who place a low value on their time (probably the unemployed, 
old people, and those in low earning occupations) will clearly be advantaged by physical 
queues relative to those who place a high value on their time (business executives, people 
on short holidays, etc.), while paper queues will disadvantage those for whom time of use 
is important. 
Paper queues impose costs upon the management agency to deal with applications to join 
the queue, updating positions on the queue, and informing queuers of their position. 
Because a paper queue is essentially costless to the consumer, and there is uncertainty 
over the time of success, the paper queue will be subject to the same no-show problems 
as lotteries and reservations. 
Physical queues impose management agency costs to prevent queue jumping, to provide 
facilities for the queuers, and to administer the rationing mechanism, which will require 
the physical presence of an agency representative in most instances. 
3.2.4 Merit 
Goods may be allocated only to people satisfying arbitrary qualifications. These 
qualifications may be related to past behaviour or skills in use of the good. For example, 
in introducing individual transferable quotas to New Zealand fisheries the initial 
distribution of quotas was determined by historical involvement in the fishery. 
Alternatively, allocations may be made on any arbitrary basis, such as racial or 
socioeconomic background as a proxy for need or deservedness, or friendship with the 
decision-making authority. 
3.2.5 Effort 
A special class of merit rationing is rationing by effort. It is common to find natural 
resources rationed by effort. In this country, wilderness area management guidelines 
indicate that these areas should require (even though they don't always) one day's walk 
to reach their boundaries. This, along with the difficulty of access to many publicly 
provided outdoor recreation areas has lead Cullen (1985, p.7) to describe effort as "the 
New Zealand way of rationing," in respect to outdoor recreation. Fishing technology is 
often restricted to outmoded methods to limit the effort applied to harvesting, and 
therefore to limit catch. Effort need not be applied directly to the target activity. It 
could be regarded as a price that may be levied in any unit. For example, wapiti hunting 
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blocks in Fiordland have been partly rationed by the requirement that applicants must 
have contributed to animal management operations in the area. 
Because the effort required to obtain access to the resource is often 'wasted' rationing 
by effort is inefficient. Obviously, the fishing example provides clearer evidence of this 
than the wapiti case. The method also discriminates amongst those with different 
abilities to supply effort, e.g. the old or physically, mentally, or financially less able 
members of society. 
If this method is applied as a once only requirement, it will work like a two-part tariff 
with a zero marginal price. This will effectively discriminate against casual or infrequent 
resource users. 
In many instances, increases in demand will cause problems as effort requirements to 
meet any desired level of use will have to be amended upwards. This may be quite 
infeasible in rationing some resources. Public roads and rail services, for example, cannot 
be closed or re-routed simply to control access to a wilderness area. It may be equally 
as absurd to increase proficiency requirements to levels requiring extraordinary levels of 
knowledge, or extraordinary investment to obtain that knowledge. If, however, little 
investment is required to meet requirements, then effort is unlikely to provide a useful 
management tool. High effort requirements are therefore likely to be both 
discriminatory and inefficient. Low effort requirements are likely to be ineffective. 
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4 Methods for comparing allocation tools 
The total benefit obtained from any resource allocation scheme is the sum of consumers' 
and producers' surpluses. Consumers' surplus is a measure of the benefits accruing to 
consumers. It is equal to the difference between the total amount that the consumers 
who actually obtain the goods would have been willing to pay for them and the total 
amount they actually paid to obtain them. Similarly, producers' surplus is the difference 
between the revenue obtained by the producer (or distributor) and the cost of supplying 
the goods. Efficient distribution schemes maximise the sum of consumers' and producers' 
surpluses, without regard to which group obtains the benefits. Clearly, benefits are 
maximised when the lowest cost producers supply goods to those consumers willing to 
pay the most. As long as willingness to pay, also known as marginal benefit, is greater 
than marginal costs of provision it is efficient to supply more of the good, and vice versa. 
In the cases we are concerned with here supply is fixed and there is only one supplier 
(the management agency), implying that efficient allocations may be determined by 
reference to demand characteristics alone. 
Again, it should be noted that efficient allocation is a restricted concept of efficiency, 
since it relies on the exogenous determination of quantities. A general concept of 
efficiency requires that marginal social cost equals marginal social benefit. Satisfying this 
condition generally requires that quantity is an endogenous variable. 
There are many measures of consumers' surplus. The most common are Marshallian 
surplus, compensating surplus, compensating variation, equivalent surplus and equivalent 
variation. Marshallian consumers' surplus is simply the area under the demand curves 
of those consumers who obtain the goods, less any costs of obtaining the goods. To 
obtain a true measure of welfare change, the compensating or equivalent measures must 
be used. These measures indicate willingness to pay for increments or decrements in 
consumption given a fixed level of utility. Compensating measures use the existing level 
of utility as a base, while equivalent measures use the utility level that would result if the 
changed conditions occurred. The compensating measures are appropriate to determine 
potential Pareto welfare changes, and are therefore preferred for efficiency analyses. 
Compensating measures are not easily derived, certainly in comparison to the much more 
readily accessible Marshallian surplus. A seminal paper by Willig (1976) identifies 
conditions under which these measures approximate each other. In most practical cases 
they may be used interchangeably. In the interests of greater clarity, and without great 
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loss of generality, the Marshallian measure of consumers' surplus will be used throughout 
this paper to determine the magnitude and distribution of consumer benefits. Further 
discussion of welfare measurement may be found in Devine (1987). 
Producer (management agency) benefits will be measured by producer's surplus, also 
known as profits. Profit is the difference between total revenue and total cost of supply. 
Since cost information is unavailable here, the measure of producer benefits used is total 
revenue. Again there is little loss in generality, as the measure will be indicative of the 
relative impacts of alternative allocation mechanisms. Since the quantity of the good to 
be distributed is fixed, so is the cost of supply (recalling the earlier assumption of zero 
or homogeneous costs of supply). Hence, producer benefits \-vill vary directly with 
revenue. An increase (or decrease) of $X in revenue will result in a $X increase (or 
decrease) in producer's surplus. 
In many instances the transactions costs of resource allocation methods are not known, 
but these are real, and vary by method for consumers and producers. Hence, the 
measures of benefit identified here are gross. They do not (and cannot) incorporate 
these unknown transactions costs. Wherever possible, the nature of transactions costs 
will be identified. 
Measurement of distributional impacts is not as straightforward as the efficiency analysis. 
It has already been indicated that there are no unambiguous measures of equity, 
consequently there arises a point where some ad hoc choice must be made. This study 
will be concerned with two major distributional impacts: the distribution of benefits and 
costs between producers and consumers, and the distribution of benefits amongst 
consumers. The former will be analysed by comparing consumers' and producer 
surpluses for alternative allocation procedures. The latter will be analysed by attempting 
to identify which consumer groups are advantaged and disadvantaged by each of the 
resource allocation schemes investigated. 
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5 Measurement of allocation tool impacts 
Throughout the following analysis the aggregate demand curve (which is the marginal 
social benefit function, remembering the earlier assumption of no externalities) is 
represented by the function p=f(q), or by its inverse q=h(p). 
5.1 Fixed competitive prices 
In the single, fixed (competitive) price case, illustrated by Figure 5.1, the monopolist 
chooses price Po to allocate the fixed supply qo' Charging a lower price will result in 
excess demand, leading to the adoption of additional rationing mechanisms or overuse 
of the resource,depending upon the strength of the quantity constraint. If the quantity 
constraint is immutable, those consumers who gain access to the goods will obtain 
benefits equal to the difference between Po and the lower price for each unit distributed. 
However, there is no guarantee that no consumers with marginal benefits less than Po will 
obtain access to the good, resulting in inefficient allocations. 
a 
p 
o 
o Q 
Figure 5.1 Competitive pricing. 
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When the competitive price, Po, is charged the resulting benefit distribution is: 
Revenue = R = PoqO 
qo 
Consumers' surplus = CS = f f(q) dq 
- Poqo 
0 
qo 
Total benefits =B = f f(q) dq 
0 
These benefits may be interpreted as areas in Figure 5.1. These are: 
R 
CS 
B 
= 
= 
Fixed pricing at Po provides an efficient allocation of resources. It is not possible to 
obtain greater aggregate benefits without changing the quantity of the good supplied. No 
recipient of the good has a willingness to pay what is less than any individual who did not 
obtain access to the good. It may, however, be possible to find other allocation schemes 
with identical total benefits, but that distribute those benefits differently. 
It often occurs that those who are responsible for resource allocation do not have 
intimate knowledge of the market demand curve, and consequently are unable to identify 
accurately the competitive price. The implications of setting a price different to Po 
depend on whether the price set is greater than or less than the competitive price. If 
price is less than Po the revenue obtained is reduced by the difference in price multiplied 
by the quantity distributed. If p is less than Po consumers obtain additional benefits 
relative to the case in which p equals Po, but these additional benefits are less than the 
loss in revenue incurred by the distributor since some people with marginal benefits less 
than Po probably obtain access to the resource, displacing some of those with higher 
valuations. Pricing too low is therefore inefficient and the distributor still has the 
problem of allocating the good, since demand is greater than supply. 
If price is set above the competit~ve level the distributor will be left with unallocated 
goods. If these goods are not subsequently allocated then overpricing is clearly 
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inefficient. It could, however, be made efficient if price is lowered until the market 
clears. Either way, those obtaining access to the goods receive lower benefits than if the 
competitive price is charged. The change in distributor revenue from pricing above Po 
is dependent upon demand elasticity. It may be positive (if demand is inelastic at Po) or 
negative (if demand is elastic at Po). This issue is examined further in the next section. 
5.2 Single-price revenue maximisation 
The monopolist may decide not to allocate all of the good. It may be possible to 
increase revenue in some instances by charging a price Pl greater than Po and hence 
allocate a quantity ql that is less than qo' This possibility is illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
Because the ql units distributed are allocated to those with the greatest willingness to pay 
this strategy is efficient for allocating the quantity ql' but since there is no cost in 
providing the additional qo-ql units, and there are positive marginal benefits from doing 
so, there is a loss in efficiency from decreasing supply in this manner. The efficiency loss 
is equal to the shaded area qlcbqo in Figure 5.2. 
P 
1 
p 
o 
Marginal revenue function 
Figure 5.2 Single-price revenue maximisation. 
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Q 
We now have: 
cs = 
R = 
B = 
ql 
f f(q) dq 
o 
= area P1ac 
= area Oacql 
The losses in efficiency and consumer benefits relative to a fixed, competitive price policy 
are: 
ql 
~CS= f f(q) dq + ql(PO-Pl) + PO(qO-ql) 
qo 
= area POPl cb < 0 
There may, however, be an increase in revenue: 
= area POPl cd less area ql dbqo, 
which is greater than zero when demand is inelastic at Po' 
Increasing price above the competitive level will only increase total revenue if demand 
is inelastic at qo' In other words, the own-price elasticity for the good must be less than 
unity, implying that marginal revenue is negative. 
Own price demand elasticity (1]) is defined as: 
where Qd is the quantity demanded at price P. 
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Demand is defined to be inelastic when 17 is less than one. This means that a one 
percent increase in price will result in less than a one percent decrease in demand. 
Consequently, charging a higher price will result in more revenue, even though less units 
are sold. 
5.3 Lottery 
Assuming a negligible cost to consumers of entering a lottery to obtain access to the 
rationed good, all q2 consumers with positive willingness to pay will enter the lottery. Of 
these, only qo will be successful. Since the lottery chooses randomly from all applicants 
it is most unlikely that the qo individuals with the greatest marginal benefits will be 
selected. The lottery is therefore inefficient a priori. If there is no fee all benefits accrue 
to consumers and revenue is zero. Because allocation is random it is not possible to 
determine benefits a priori. Expected benefits will be used here for the purpose of 
comparative analysis. It is possible to incorporate measures of central tendency, once the 
demand function is known, to provide confidence limits on predicted outcomes. For 
clarity, this will not be done here. 
E[CS] = E[B] = 
q2 
J f(q) dq 
o 
Figure 5.3 illustrates this case. The average benefit obtained by the q2 potential users 
is Pu resulting in total (expected) benefits of ppqo from allocating qo units. This is area 
OPL eqo' An efficient allocation mechanism (e.g. competitive pricing) will allocate the 
resource to the qo people with highest marginal benefits, resulting in average benefits of 
pp and total benefits equal to area Oppdqo in Figure 5.3. Clearly, total benefits from 
pricing are greater than expected benefits from a lottery. 
The pure lottery has a major disadvantage to the management agency in that it does not 
earn any revenue. This problem may be addressed by combining the method with 
pricing. Two alternatives exist: charge applicants a non-refundable fee to enter the 
lottery, and charge successful applicants a fee for using the resource. 
5.3.1 Lottery with fee for successful applicants 
Suppose a fee P3 is charged for successful lottery entrants and all entrants are aware of 
the fee before entering the lottery. Only those who would obtain marginal benefits 
greater than or equal to P3 would enter the lottery. The result of eliminating those 
obtaining the smallest use benefits in this way is an improvement in efficiency vis a vis 
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the pure lottery. In the limit, as the success fee is raised to the competitive price total 
benefits become identical to those obtained from a fixed, competitive price, Po, as only 
those willing to pay Po enter the lottery and the probability of success is unity. 
8 
p 
p 
P 
L 
p 
o 
a 
o 
Figure 5.3 Lottery. 
d 
Average benefit function 
Q 
36 
At success-fee P3 the number of people entering the lottery will be q3 = h(P3)' as 
illustrated in Figure 5.4. Benefit levels are then: 
p 
p 
p 
s 
p 
o 
P 
3 
= area Op:£qo 
= area P3Psfg 
% 
E[BJ = (qo!q3). J f( q) dq 
o 
a 
g 
o 
d 
Figure 5.4 Lottery with success fee. 
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Average benefit function 
Q 
5.3.2 Lottery with entry fee 
Analysis of outcomes resulting from a lottery in which there is a non-refundable 
participation fee (P4) is complicated by the fact that the expected benefits of paying the 
fee are determined by the number of people entering the lottery. If individuals do not 
have accurate information on the likely actions of others, choosing an optimal policy 
becomes problematical. For the sake of analysis, let us assume that individuals know 
each others' preferences intimately, or there has been a long history of similar lotteries 
which provides an accurate estimate of the probability of success (ID. 
Success in the lottery results in benefits to the individual of a-P4' where a is the 
individual's willingness to pay for access to the good. Failure to win the lottery results 
in a loss of P4' The expected benefit to the individual of entering the lottery is therefore: 
E[CS] = IT(a-P4) - (1-IDp4 
= ITa-P4 
The expected benefits of not entering the lottery are zero. A risk-neutral individual will 
enter the lottery as long as the expected benefits of doing so are at least as great as from 
abstaining. That is, a risk-neutral individual will enter the lottery as long as ITa~p4' 
Alternatively, only those individuals with marginal benefits at least as great as /3 (/3 =pJID 
will enter the lottery, resulting in q4= h(/3) applicants (Figure 5.5). Note that the 
probability of success is determined by the number of applicants (IT = qolq4) , providing 
three equations in three unknowns; q4' /3, IT. The three equations are: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
/3 
/3 
IT 
=pJIT 
= f(q4) 
= qolq4 
Solving this series of equations yields the equilibrium result: 
which may be solved for q4 in terms of the known parameters qo and P4' The resulting 
distribution of benefits is: 
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Revenue 
E[CS] to successful applicants 
E[CS] to unsuccessful applicants 
E[B] 
P 
E 
{1 
P 4 
a 
0 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
qo 
Figure 5.5 Lottery with entry fee. 
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P4q4 
area 0P4kq4 
q4 
IT· f f(q) dq - P4qO 
0 
area P4PEhj 
PiQ4-qO) 
area QoikQ4 
(N.B. this is a loss) 
IT· 
Q4 
f f(Q) dQ 
o 
Average benefit function 
k: 
I 
: 
· 
· 
· 
q4 q2 Q 
5.4 Advance reservation 
Advance reservations allocate the resource to those who make their plans the earliest. 
There is no reason to believe that these people will be the ones obtaining the highest 
marginal benefits from use of the resource. The benefits obtained from the resulting 
allocation will depend upon the correlation between willingness to pay and ability to 
predict desires in the future. A perfect positive correlation will result in the same 
efficient allocation as competitive pricing but, since there is no fee payable, consumers 
obtain additional benefits from advance registration equal to the revenue obtained under 
competitive pricing. If correlation is perfectly negative advance registration will result in 
the least efficient allocation possible. Zero correlation results in the result expected from 
a pure lottery. 
If correlation between forward planning and willingness to pay is perfect and positive: 
qo 
cs = B = f f( q) dq 
o 
If there is no correlation: 
q4 
CS = B = (qolq4) f f(q) dq 
o 
If correlation is perfect and negative: 
q4 
CS = B = f f( q) dq 
Y 
No-shows present a particular problem for analysis of advance reservations. The 
foregoing results assume that there are none. If there is no cost to cancelling a 
reservation, all potential resource users will find it advantageous to 'take out insurance' 
by making reservations to cover future contingencies. If some of these people then 
decide not to use the resource, others who would benefit from resource use may be 
precluded from access. 
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Shelby and Danley (1979) summarise research into use of reservation systems for 
campgrounds. They list the following points: 
(1) Reservations favour users who can and do plan ahead, so not everyone benefits 
from the change to such systems. Identification of and provision for users who do 
not plan ahead is important to avoid their exclusion. 
(2) Reservation systems involve a wide range of variables, including automation, 
centralisation, method of making the reservation, and specific reservation policies. 
These should be carefully evaluated in light of agency goals and constraints 
because they significantly affect efficiency and acceptability of the system. 
(3) No-shows remain one of the significant drawbacks to reservations. Methods to 
reduce no-shows include pre-payments, penalties, and adjusting the method by 
which reservations are made. 
(4) Reservation systems are expensive; it is important to consider who benefits from 
the service and who pays for it. 
(5) Overall use of campgrounds is reported to increase with reservations, probably as 
a result of visitor referral. Campers who would otherwise be turned away during 
peak times are referred by the system to less popular places or times. This may 
result in more complete utilisation of the resource. 
(6) Campgrounds using reservation systems show a significant reduction in visitor-
related problems such as thefts and vandalism. This is apparently due to either 
the type of users most likely to make reservations or the accountability that 
results from recording names and addresses. 
(7) Users who obtain satisfactory reservations will be happy with the system; those 
turned away will probably be disgruntled, but may still support the system. 
Referral to available places or times is preferred to denial, both from an efficiency 
and a political standpoint. 
The time lag between making reservations and use of the resource result in uncertainty 
for consumers. Consequently, the same problems that affect lotteries also affect 
reservation systems. Stankey and Baden (1977) reviewed the use of reservation systems 
for allocating wilderness and found: 
"Where free of charge, people make reservations even if there is a low 
probability that they will ever, in fact, use their privilege. In effect, the 
reservation is free insurance of the opportunity to go. For example, in 
1973 the Inyo National Forest, California, rationed use of the Mt. Whitney 
Trail to a maximum of 75 parties per day. Forest officials estimate that 
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approximately one-half of the reservations resulted in no-shows. People 
also make multiple reservations to maintain the broadest options until a 
decision has to be made. Unless no-shows can be allocated, the area will 
often be underutilised even at times when demand for entry is very high," 
and continue, 
"a wilderness buff who gains great satisfaction from wilderness could be 
denied entry by a casual, relatively disinterested visitor whose request 
happened to be postmarked earlier .... The relative worth of the experience 
would have little bearing on chances for getting a reservation. Obviously, 
a perfectly functioning system for marketing reservations would 
substantially reduce this source of inefficiency". 
5.5 Queuing 
Physical queues are conceptually similar to advance reservations. The major differences 
occur because of the added costs of queuing, and avoidance of the no-show problem. 
Queues may also be considered a form of pricing in which the price is the amount of 
time that must be expended to obtain access. Unlike pricing, however, the time is wasted 
and the time price is not necessarily known before joining the queue. Because time is 
wasted in queues, the queue can never be an efficient rationing mechanism. Introduction 
of the concept of transactions costs could alter this conclusion however if, for example, 
the value of time wasted plus the cost of administering a queue was less than the costs 
of administering a fixed price market. 
5.6 Effort 
Resource use may be limited by imposing effort requirements that force up the cost of 
using the resource. Each individual faces the same physical costs (e.g. a hike of 10 km 
to reach a recreation area), but each individual places a different value on the physical 
cost. For example, to an athlete this may represent a minor inconvenience, while to a 
paraplegic it may become an insurmountable obstacle. By deducting this additional cost 
from the benefit of use a new (nett) measure of benefit is obtained. This measure is 
illustrated in Figure 5.6. If effort is to be the sole method of rationing, the nett benefit 
curve must pass through the x-axis at qo. The area under the nett benefit curve is clearly 
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less than the area under the original demand curve, implying that effort can never be an 
efficient rationing mechanism. Since no money costs are incurred by users, rationing by 
effort may increase the benefits accruing to them. Whether this occurs depends upon 
the relative shapes of the two demand curves and no judgement can be made a priori. 
o Q 
Figure 5.6 Effort. 
5.7 Discriminatory pricing 
Discriminatory pricing schemes allow the possibility that different people are charged 
different prices for identical goods. The most common discriminatory pricing procedures 
are: first-degree, or perfect, price discrimination; second-degree discrimination, 
incorporating block tariffs and two-part tariffs; and third-degree, or inter-group, price 
discrimination. 
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5.7.1 First-degree price discrimination 
Perfect price discrimination requires that each user is charged a price equal to that 
individual's maximum willingness to pay for the total quantity consumed by them. This 
allocation method requires perfect knowledge of every individual's demand function. If 
this knowledge is available it is a simple matter to identify those individuals with the 
greatest willingness to pay and to allocate the resource to them, resulting in an efficient 
distribution that delivers all benefits to the resource administrator, and none to 
consumers. Of course, allocation could occur free-of-charge, in which case all benefits 
accrue to the users. When a charge is levied we have: 
CS = 0 
R = B = 
qo 
f f(q) dq 
o 
The efficiency of perfect discrimination arises because the monopolist is able to use the 
market marginal benefit function as his or her marginal benefit function. The monopolist 
will maximise profits by equating market marginal benefits with (the monopolist'S) 
marginal costs when there is no capacity constraint, or maximising the difference between 
total benefits and total (monopolist's) costs when there is a capacity constraint. In either 
case, in the absence of externalities, the monopolist's benefits are maximised when the 
resource is allocated efficiently. 
5.7.2 Two-part tariffs 
Two-part tariffs are a method for extracting consumer surplus by charging a fixed fee 
before allowing any use of a service, or purchasing the first unit of a good. Examples 
include 'connection fees', tied sales, and entrance fees. Once the initial fee has been paid 
the individual may purchase any number of units at a constant unit price. The two-part 
tariff is discriminatory in that individuals purchasing different quantities face different 
average prices. Those consuming small quantities face higher average costs than those 
consuming larger quantities. A prerequisite for the introduction of a two-part tariff is 
that the product cannot be resold. If this condition was not met there would be an 
advantage to consumers in forming associations to limit the number of connection fees 
paid. 
Oi (1971) raised the question of whether it is optimal for a vendor to charge high 
admission fees and charge a low unit price, or to allow free entry and charge a high unit 
price. His conclusion was that profits are maximised by extracting all consumer surplus 
as an entry fee and charging marginal costs for each unit consumed. Given that 
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individuals are not identical, this implies the need for third-degree discrimination in 
entrance fees. 
Since the entrance fee part of the tariff i;:; a lump-sum transfer from consumers to 
vendor, and individual units are sold at marginal cost, the two-part tariff is an efficient 
means of resource allocation when there is no quantity constraint, since the good will be 
consumed to the point where marginal cost equals marginal benefit. In the presence of 
a quantity constraint the fees are set so that the entrance fee is equal to the value of 
consumer surplus when a market clearing price is charged, and the unit price is set equal 
to that market clearing price. This situation is also Pareto-optimal, given the quantity 
constraint. 
Maximum vendor revenue is obtained from non-identical consumers by charging each 
consumer an entry fee equal to the consumer surplus (s )he would obtain at the current 
unit price. We now consider the case in which a uniform entry fee must be charged for 
non-identical consumers. Two situations are commonly addressed: (i) no consumers are 
excluded from the market, and (ii) the monopolist may choose the number of consumers 
in the market. In the first case, maximum revenue is (usually) obtained by setting the 
entrance fee at less than the consumer surplus earned by the consumer earning the least 
surplus when price equals marginal cost, and setting the unit price above marginal cost. 
Oi (1971) describes conditions in which revenue is maximised when unit price is set below 
marginal cost. 
Because the restriction that all consumers must be serviced is a constraint on the options 
of the monopolist, it is apparent that the monopolist ca.n earn greater revenue in the case 
where it is able to choose an entrance fee that limits the number of consumers. 
These conclusions are best illustrated by a simple example. Suppose there are two 
individuals (A and B) who demand a specific product (x). Their respective linear 
demand functions are: 
Individual A: 
Individual B: 
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xa = 25-p/4 
Xb = 12-p/5 
The aggregate demand function is therefore: 
x = 37-9p/20 
X = 25-p/4 
if 0:5p:560 
if 100~p~60 
The product is costless to produce. Given no restrictions on the monopolist's behaviour 
the revenue-maximising strategy is to allocate~7-units at zero tiiiit cos-t, but charging 
discriminative entrance fees of $1250 and $360 for individuals A and B respectively, 
yielding a profit of $1610 for the monopolist and zero surplus for consumers. The 
monopolist has efficiently extracted all the consumer surplus. This outcome occurs 
because the marginal revenue function for allocating additional units to each individual 
is simply the individual's demand function. Setting marginal revenue to marginal cost 
results in 25 units being allocated to individual A and 12 units to B. 
Now assume that the monopolist is unable to charge discriminating tariffs. The 
monopolist has two options: 
(1) charge a high entrance fee, so that only one consumer enters the market, 
(2) charge a (entrance fee, unit price) pair of consumers so that maximum 
revenue is obtained when both consumers remain in the market. 
Under option (i) the monopolist would set unit price to zero and charge an entrance fee 
equal to the surplus obtained by individual A ($1250), resulting in revenue of $1250 from 
the 25 units allocated and zero consumers' surplus. 
Under option (ii) the outcome is not as clear cut. The monopolist no longer maximises 
revenue by setting unit price equal to marginal cost. As long as unit price is zero the 
monopolist can charge lump-sum entrance fees up to $360 without driving anyone from 
the market. Setting unit price greater than zero will require correspondingly smaller 
entrance fees to retain all consumers. The maximum entrance fee is the consumer's 
surplus earned by individual B for any given price (CS=[60-p][6-p/10]). Sales revenue 
at price p is simply price multiplied by the quantity sold, which may be determined from 
the aggregate demand curve (SR=p[37-9p/20]). Total revenue may therefore be 
expressed as a function of unit price (TR=720+ 13p-p2/4). Differentiating with respect 
to p and solving yields a revenue-maximising unit price of $26.00, which allocates 25.30 
units. The entrance fee is $115.60, resulting in total revenue of $889.00. 
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The monopolist maximises profits in this example by charging an entrance fee that drives 
one consumer from the market and reduces total consumption of the good. Total 
benefits are maximised by allowing the monopolist to charge differential entrance fees, 
this policy is efficient but robs consumers of all benefits. Retaining both consumers in 
the market is inefficient (total benefits equal the- monopolists profits [$889] plus the 
surplus obtained by individual A [$568.90] for a total of $1357.90) and results in lowered 
monopolist profits, but does ensure some consumers' surplus accrues. Allowing the 
monopolist to dictate the number of consumers in the market improves the monopolist's 
profits [$1250], but this option extracts all consumer surplus in this case and is the least 
efficient option. 
Similar reasoning pertains to the quantity constrained case, except that in the two buyer 
case only one (unit price, entrance fee) combination will satisfy the quantity constraint 
when both individuals are in the market. Clearly, when there are more than two buyers 
a number of options exist, but efficiency is attained only in the case where the monopolist 
is free to discriminate on entrance fees. 
5.7.3 Block tariffs 
Many pricing schemes entail changes in marginal prices for individual consumers beyond 
consumption thresholds. The price may be $X per unit for the first A units, $Y per unit 
for the next B units, and $Z per unit for each unit after A + B units. Block tariffs can be 
discrete, with as few as two blocks, or may be continuous, in which case each unit has a 
unique cost. Block tariffs are often preferred to two-part tariffs because they reduce the 
need for the selling agency to continually collect information on individual buyers. The 
buyers 'select' their own tariff by their choice of quantity. However, the prerequisite of 
inability to re-sell remains, with the added necessity of monitoring total sales to each 
buyer. 
The importance of this allocation tool is summarised by Willig (1978, p.58) "when a 
uniform" price at marginal cost is rendered undesirable by economies of scale and the 
infeasibility of lump-sum transfers, Pareto efficiency requires a nonlinear outlay schedule 
whose marginal price for the largest purchase is equated to marginal cost." This theme 
is echoed by Spence (1977, p.9): "Quantity dependent prices can be thought of as a 
generalisation of two-part tariffs for instances in which the firm either cannot distinguish 
among consumers or is not permitted to do so." Willig proceeds to show that "Skewed 
and possibly undesirable income distributional effects of the two-part tariff can be 
avoided by offering consumers a choice between a uniform price and a two-part rate. 
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The surprising fact is that a choice which is preferred to [a constant unit price] by all 
consumers and which also increases [supplier profits] can be proffered" (Willig 1978, 
p.61). 
5. Z4 Third-degree price discrimination 
Vendors possessing market power have the opportunity to increase revenue and profits 
by differentiating amongst types of resource user and charging members of each group 
a constant unit price unique to that group. This practice commonly manifests itself as 
'discounts' to particular social groups, such as the aged, the unemployed, the poor, 
beneficiaries, and children. While some merchants may be offering discounts out of 
compassion for the less-well-off, and usually seek to proclaim publicly such benevolence, 
it is often claimed that they are interested solely in maximising their own welfare. 
Market segregation is a device for extracting consumer surplus. While it may benefit 
some people who obtain access to goods at cheaper prices than they would otherwise 
face, these benefits are more than offset by the loss of benefits to those members of 
society with relatively less elastic demand functions. 
The procedure entails charging prices to each group to equate marginal revenues across 
all groups. Because groups have different demand elasticities, equating marginal 
revenues implies that marginal benefits are not uniform across groups, and inter-group 
price discrimination is inefficient. The degree of inefficiency is directly dependent upon 
the differences in demand elasticities, which is cause for concern because it is precisely 
those cases where large differences exist that inter-group price discrimination is most 
beneficial to vendors. 
The conditions for profit maximisation under inter-group price discrimination are: 
(1) \I i,j 
(2) I: qj = Q 
i where Q is the total quantity to be allocated. 
In the two group case the quantities to be allocated to each group are determined by 
equation 3: 
(3) qj = 0(1 + 1/rh)/(2+ l/T1i+ l/17j) 
where 17k is own price elasticity of demand for group k. 
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The price to be charged each group may be found by substitution in the relevant demand 
equations. 
To illustrate the effects of third-degree price discrimination, let us investigate a 
hypothetical linear case. Suppose there are 20 (divisible) units of a particular good to 
be allocated, with demand from two separate, identifiable groups. The demand functions 
for each group are: 
Group 1: 
Group 2: 
PI = 100-4ql 
P2 = 40-2q2 
The market demand curve is therefore: 
Q d = 45-.75p when p ~ 40 
and 
Qd = 25-.25p when p S 40 
A single, uniform price of $33.33 would clear the 20 units on the market, allocating 16.67 
units to Group 1 and 3.33 units to Group 2. A profit-maximising, discriminating 
monopolist would charge prices of $53.33 to members of Group 1 and $23.33 to members 
of Group 2, resulting in sales of 11.67 and 8.33 units to the respective groupSl. 
The outcomes under the two approaches are: 
Benefits to Group 1 
Benefits to Group 2 
Total consumer benefits 
Revenue 
Total benefits 
Uniform price 
$ 555.67 
$ 11.11 
$ 566.78 
$ 666.66 
$1233.44 
Discriminatory price 
$ 272.72 
$ 69.43 
$ 341.65 
$ 816.24 
$1158.49 
While total benefits have been reduced only slightly (a six percent loss in efficiency), the 
distribution of benefi1~ has chan~~d dramaticalJy. Members of Group 2 have benefited, 
1 The marginal revenue functions for the groups are: 
MRI = 100 - 8ql 
MR2 = 40 - 4q2 
Equating marginal revenues and letting ql +q2=20 yields the result reported above. 
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as has the vendor, however the most dramatic change is the loss of benefits to members 
of Group 1. 
Two major pre-requisites must be met before implementation of third-degree price 
discrimination schemes is possible. Members of each group must be readily identifiable, 
and transactions between groups must not be possible. Such conditions are easily met 
in the utilities markets where groups may be readily identifiable by property location or 
value, or people may be required to prove membership of a particular group (e.g. 
pensioner) before being eligible for concessionary rates. The products of utilities are not 
easily re-sold as it is difficult and expensive to transfer gas, electricity and water from one 
property to another. Airlines address these problems by requiring certification of group 
membership (e.g. student identification card) and issuing non-transferable tickets. 
5.8 Single item auctions 
In addressing auction behaviour it is important to differentiate between two major causes 
for individuals to place different values on the goode s) being auctioned. In the first 
instance, the good has some common, but unknown, value to each individual. For 
example, the value of an oil right is determined to a large extent by the market price of 
the oil, the quantity present, and the costs of its extraction. The first of these factors is 
generally well known, however the other two are both uncertain, causing different 
individuals to make different estimates of the value of the oil right to them even though 
the actual value to each individual is identical. The second cause of disparity in value is 
termed the independent private values model. In this instance the value of the good is 
different to each individual. This value is determined by the individual's circumstances, 
including tastes and factors such as quality of harvesting, processing} and marketing 
services. Tastes are likely to be the basis for determining values of goods such as 
artworks, antiques, or collectibles, while business efficiency is likely to determine 
individual values of natural resources such as mill able forest, farmland, and fish stocks. 
Our primary interest is in the second cause of value disparity. Cases of common but 
uncertain value present distributional issues, but do not involve issues of efficiency. Both 
distributional matters and efficiency are determined by the resulting allocation in the 
independent private values case. An interesting aspect of the common value case is the 
'winners curse'. Since value is determined exogenously and bidders are uncertain of that 
value it is possible that the net value of the good to the winning bidder is negative. 
Winning an auction of this nature is a signal that the estimate of value placed on the 
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good is greater than all other estimates and is therefore likely to be greater than the true 
value of the resource. 
We now concentrate our attention on the class of auction that allocates a single item, 
such as a work of art, or the rights to operate a concession operation, extract minerals, 
or harvest a discrete block of forest. The three common types of auction we will address 
are English, Dutch and simultaneous auctions. The latter has two major forms; first-price 
and second-price. In the first-price simultaneous auction the winning bidder pays the 
amount bid by him or her, whereas in the second-price variant (often termed the Vickrey 
auction) the winner pays the value of the next highest bid. 
5.8.1 English auction 
This form of auction is probably the most common in New Zealand. It is used widely to 
sell wool, fruit and vegetables, livestock, real estate, second-hand furniture and 
automobiles, and to dispose of surplus, repossessed, or confiscated goods. It is 
characterised by the auctioneer (who represents the seller) announcing an opening value 
and seeking bids at that level. If unsuccessful the auctioneer is forced to lower the value 
until a bid is forthcoming. The auctioneer then announces a higher value than the 
current bid and seeks a bid at this level. The bid is increased until no-one is willing to 
bid any higher, and the goods are sold to the person who made the highest bid, for the 
price that person bid. All bidders are aware of the current bid (but not necessarily who 
holds it) throughout the auction, and are able to bid as often as they desire at any point 
during the auction as long as the bid is not less than the current bid, leading to the 
description of this mechanism as an open, ascending bid auction. 
The English auction is an efficient method for allocating single units. There is no 
incentive for any individual to bid greater than his or her maximum willingness to pay (Pi) 
since this will result in a loss of utility should that individual win the auction2• Suppose 
there are two individuals still bidding, with maximum willingness to pay PI and P 2 
respectively. Assume PI is greater than P 2' Whenever the bid is less than P 2 the 
individual not holding the bid has an incentive to increase the bid. If the person not 
holding the bid does not increase the bid they will not obtain the good and their utility 
is unchanged from its present level. If they do increase the bid to some level less than 
their own maximum willingness to pay they have a chance of winning the auction and 
improving their welfare (by the difference between Pi and their new bid). Clearly, the 
2 Some individuals may see some benefit in bidding above their maximum willingness to pay and 
not winning the auction. For example, they may wish to force the price up for their competitors. 
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English auction will result in the good are then allocated to individual 1 at some price 
between PI and P 2. If the incremental bid size is small relative to P 2 the sale price will 
approximate P 2' 
Little can be said about the distribution of benefits, except that the vendor is likely to 
obtain less revenue than would be possible by perfect discrimination. If P 2 is much less 
than PI the buyer is likely to obtain a large-surpfiis,whereasTfP;and~P~are nearly equal 
the buyer will obtain a negligible surplus. The price attained at auction is not governed 
by the winner's maximum willingness to pay, but by the maximum willingness to pay of 
the second-highest bidder. If there is little competition and the vendor has some 
knowledge of the likely distribution of willingness to pay, revenue may be increased by 
selling at a fixed price. However, if consumers also have knowledge of the demand for 
the good they may be unwilling to pay the asked price, the sale price is thus determined 
by relative bargaining power. 
5.8.2 Dutch auction 
The Dutch auction is an open, decreasing bid auction. Anyone can bid at any time. The 
current value is announced by the auctioneer, and if no-one bids at this level the value 
is lowered. This procedure continues until the first bid is received, the goode s) being sold 
to the bidder at the price bid. The potential problems of ties are circumvented in many 
auctions of this type by the use of electronic apparatus requiring bidders to hit a switch. 
As with the English auction, there is no incentive to bid at a price above the value of the 
good to the individual (Pi). Bidding Pi does not result in any change in utility so only bids 
less than Pi will be made. In choosing how far below Pi to.bid, an individual will-consider 
the expected payoffs from making bids at different levels. These payoffs are influenced 
by the level of the bid and the probability of success, which is determined by the bidder's 
expectations of other contestants' actions. A high bid will have a relatively high 
probability of a low benefit, while a low bid will have a low probability of a high benefit. 
As long as the probability of winning by making a bid below Pi is positive there is an 
incentive for each individual to bid below Pi. Individual bids will be influenced by the 
individual's attitude to risk, and their expectations over the distribution of bids of the 
other bidders. 
The Dutch auction will be an efficient method for allocating a single item as long as the 
person with the highest Pi makes the highest bid, although the price at which the good 
is traded is indeterminate. There is, of course, no guarantee that an efficient allocation 
will occur, especially as individuals have different attitudes to risk-taking, and different 
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expectations of the other bidders. No comment can be made on the distribution of 
benefits, although Riley and Samuelson (1981) indicate the same expected revenue from 
this form of auction as from the English and Vickrey auctions when buyers are risk-
neutral and the common value assumption is applicable. It would be expected that 
where many individuals attend the auction and each is unaware of the others' preferences 
or intended bidding behaviour a higher price would pertain than in the few bidders or 
known preferences cases. 
5.8.3 Simultaneous, first-price auctions 
Simultaneous auctions are closed. Bidders are unaware of who the other participants 
are, or the level of their bids. In the first-price variant the winning bidder is the 
individual bidding the highest amount, and this person is required to make a payment 
equal to their own bid. 
There is an expected payoff (EBx) to making a bid at each price ($X). 
I.e. EBx = IIx (Pi - $X) 
where, IIx is the probability of winning the auction when bidding $X. 
EBx is clearly greater than or equal to zero for all values of X that are less than Pi' equal 
to zero when X equals Pi' and less than or equal to zero when X is greater than Pi' As 
with the English auction there is a disincentive to bidding greater than Pi and no benefit 
in bidding Pi' The only sensible course of action is to make a bid less than Pi' 
The outcome is determined by the individual perceptions of the distributions of 
probabilities over bid values, and individual attitudes toward risk-taking. As with the 
Dutch auction, there is no a priori reason to expect that the person with the highest Pi 
will win the auction and provide an efficient outcome. The first-price simultaneous 
auction is therefore expected to be inefficient, although it is not necessarily so. No 
comment can be made on distributional matters. 
Maskin and Riley (1983) describe two classes of auction that result in greater expected 
revenue than the first-price, simultaneous auction: "it is always possible to raise expected 
revenue from a high bid auction by giving buyers a choice as to whether or not to pay 
an entry fee. 'Free bids' are considered only if no buyer submits an entry fee", and "it 
is always possible to raise expected revenue from a high-bid auction with a positive 
reserve price by lowering the latter and introducing a required entry fee". They go on, 
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however, to indicate the costs of such revenue-maximising behaviour: "expected revenue 
is generally maximized by establishing auction rules such that those with sufficiently low 
valuations in excess of that of the seller choose not to participate. The resulting auction 
is therefore inefficient ex post, because there is a chance that some buyer with a valuation 
in excess of that of the seller remains out of the auction. 
5.8.4 Simultaneous second-price auctions 
The second-price auction differs from the first-price auction only in the payment that the 
highest bidder is required to make. In this instance it is not that person's own bid, but 
the value of the second-highest bid. 
This form of auction is termed incentive-compatible because the optimal strategy for 
individual bidders is to bid their maximum willingness to pay (PJ Incentive compatibility 
occurs because payments are independent of bids. Each person has three options in 
choosing a bid ($X). They may bid greater than, equal to, or less than Pi' Let us 
examine the options for a representative individual (A). 
(1) $X>Pi (Bidding more than maximum willingness to pay) 
a) If A loses the auction there is no change in welfare for A. 
b) A may win the auction and be required to pay the second highest bid ($Z). 
If Z is greater than Pi' A incurs a welfare loss of $(Z-Pi)' 
c) If A wins and Z is less than Pi' A obtains a gain of $(PcZ). Note, however, 
that if A gains (Z<P j ) the gain would still have been made by bidding Pi' 
Further, bidding Pi does not incur the risk of making a welfare loss if 
X>Z>Pi · 
Bidding Pi (telling the tlUth) dominates overstating one's maximum willingness to pay. 
(2) $X<Pi (Bidding less than maximum willingness to pay) 
a) A could win the auction and pay $Z, but would not be any better-off than if 
he or she had bid Pi' 
b) A could lose to someone who bid more than Pi' In this case A is no worse-off 
than if he or she had told the truth, since the other person would have won 
the auction anyway. 
c) A could lose to someone bidding Y such that Pi> Y>X. In this case, the only 
way that A could have won was to bid a value greater than Y. But, since any 
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bid greater than Y would result in A paying $Y and A does not know what 
Y is, A would be best to bid Pi and beat all bids less than Pi' 
Bidding Pi therefore dominates underbidding. 
Since telling the truth is superior to either under 01 ..,verbidding it is the dominant 
strategy for individual A. There is nothing special about individual A, implying that all 
individuals will respond in a similar manner and bid their maximum willingness to pay in 
a simultaneous second-price auction. 
This form of auction has a major advantage in identifying the market demand curve for 
the good, which may have important implications for the resource administrator if further 
units are to be sold in the future. It provides sufficient information to allow some form 
of discriminatory pricing to be implemented, resulting in increased vendor revenue. 
A simultaneous second-price auction will result in an efficient distribution of the item 
being auctioned, regardless of buyer attitudes toward risk-taking. Vickrey first indicated 
that first and second-price auctions result in identical expected vendor revenue for risk-
neutral bidders, and that when the seller sets a reserve price equal to the value of the 
item to him or her both mechanisms are efficient. Most research on single-item auctions 
has focused upon optimal auction design from the seller's point of view. Maskin and 
Riley (1983) summarise the results of this research, conduding that: 
"when buyers are risk-neutral and a mild restriction on [the distribution of 
buyer valuations] is satisfied, there is no auction mechanism which yields 
greater expected revenue than the high bid (or second bid) auction with 
the appropriately selected minimum price .... Various authors have also 
shown that, when buyers are risk averse, the high- and second-bid auctions 
no longer generate the same expected revenue ... the high bid auction 
yields greater expected revenue than the second-bid auction. It is then 
natural to inquire as to whether the high-bid auction can itself be improved 
upon. The answer turns out to be in the affirmative." 
Here Maskin and Riley are alluding to the possibilities of charging a fee to enter the 
auction and the seller announcing a reserve price greater than the seller's use value. 
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5.8.5 Summary 
The difficulty of choosing a socially optimal auction mechanism is summarised by Maskin 
and Riley (1983, p.205) "a major theme of the recent theoretical advances in the theory 
of auctions is that auction rules which maximize expected revenue are not efficient ex 
post. That is, a seller exploiting his monopoly power to the maximum will design a 
scheme in which there is a finite possibility that the agent with the highest valuation will 
not end up with the object for sale". The common single-item auction formats yield 
identical expected revenues in some instances under the assumption of risk-neutral 
buyers. The English and simultaneous second-price auctions are efficient methods of 
allocating a single item. The Dutch and first-price simultaneous auctions are not efficient 
a priori. When buyers are risk-averse the simultaneous first-price auction yields higher 
expected revenue than the other types. Expected revenue may be further increased in 
this case by announcing an optimally chosen reserve price before the auction. This 
reserve price will be greater than the value of the item to the seller and is based upon 
seller estimates of the distribution of buyer values. 
5.9 Multiple item auctions 
Analysis of single item auctions introduced the notion of uncertainty with regard to the 
actions of other bidders. When many homogeneous or similar items are auctioned 
simultaneously, or in close temporal proximity, the number of sources of uncertainty are 
increased many times. Bidding strategies become extremely important as individuals 
attempt to maximise their own welfare in the absence of complete knowledge of the 
preferences and strategies of their opponents. This is the domain of game theory and 
outcomes are far from certain. What has been concluded is that multiple item auctions 
are generally not efficient and that different forms of auction result in different expected 
revenues. 
Vickrey (1976) summarises: 
"the optimal [efficient] solution appears to be less often reached in 
practice when there are several items to be auctioned that react in some 
way. The simplest case is that of two or more, say n items and such that 
no bidder will want to acquire more than one of them. The 
straightforward method of auctioning them off in an open [English] auction 
in sequence is now no longer optimal, since in bidding for the first item 
each bidder will be uncertain as to where to stop in view of the possibility 
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that a subsequent item might become available for less. A Pareto optimal 
procedure is available, however, if all the items are auctioned 
simultaneously, with up to n bids permitted at any given level, the rule 
being that once n bids have been made equal to the highest bid, any 
further bid must be higher than this. Within the 'jitter' determined by the 
minimum acceptable bid increment, this assures optimal results, as does 
the strategically equivalent closed bid procedure where the n items are 
awarded to the n highest bidders at the price bid by the n + 1st bidder" 
(p14). 
The simultaneous multiple-unit auction can be divided into two classes, discriminative and 
competitive bidding (Belovicz, 1979). In the former, each successful bidder pays the 
amount nominated in their own bid, while in the latter each successful bidder pays the 
amount of the highest unsuccessful bid. Competitive bidding is the multiple-item 
equivalent of the single-item second-price auction. For the same reasons discussed under 
single-item auctions the bids received under the competitive auction format will be for 
greater amounts than under the discriminative format. The strategy earning the greatest 
revenue for the vendor is determined by the relative magnitudes of the mean successful 
discriminative bid and the highest unsuccessful competitive bid. Harris and Raviv (1981a, 
p.1488) report the results of empirical studies comparing competitive and discriminative 
sealed-bid, multiple-unit auctions: 
"1. Mean bid is larger under the competitive than under the discriminating 
auction. 
2. The variance of bids is larger under the competitive auction. 
3. The evidence regarding the comparison of seller's revenue under the 
two types of auction is inconclusive." 
Harris and Raviv proved that 1. holds whether buyers are risk-neutral or risk-averse, and 
proceeded to show that "when buyers are risk averse, the results indicate that the 
discriminating auction dominates the competitive auction in terms of expected revenue 
to the seller". 
There has been very little analysis of multiple-unit auctions in which buyers are able to 
purchase more than one unit. Vickrey indicated as early as 1961 (Vickrey, 1961) that the 
competitive, first-rejected-bid auction would be inefficient. 
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"It is not possible to consider a buyer wanting up to two units as merely 
an aggregation of two single-unit buyers: combining the two buyers into 
... one introduces a built-in collusion and community of interest, and the bid 
offered for the second unit will be influenced by the possible effect of this 
bid on the price to be paid for the first, even under the first-rejected-bid 
method .... Nor could optimal results be obtained merely by restricting all 
bids to an offer to take up to a given quantity at any price below a 
specified price, the final terms being a price equal to the price bid by the 
first unsuccessful bidder, each bidder bidding more than this being 
allocated the amount which he specified. Under such a scheme, for any 
quantity that a bidder might decide to specify, it would be advantageous for 
him to specify as his bid price the full average value of this quantity to him, 
since he would prefer this quantity to be allotted at any price lower than 
this bid rather than be excluded altogether, and a change in his bid price 
within the range in which he would be successful would not affect the 
contract price." 
To circumvent this problem, the incentive-compatible demand revelation procedures for 
public goods have been adapted to provide incentive-compatible bidding processes. Lyon 
(1982, pp.18-19) describes one type of incentive-compatible bidding mechanism for 
multiple.;.unit auctions. The Groves mechanism3 (Groves and Ledyard, 1977) that Lyon 
employs guarantees that goods are distributed efficiently. This mechanism will always 
result in payments less than or equal to those under a single-price auction because the 
nj highest rejected bids (where nj is the number of units allocated to individual i) are 
necessarily less than or equal to the highest rejected bid in the single-price procedure. 
5.9.1 Summary 
Multiple-unit auctions are not well understood. The first-rejected-bid procedure is an 
efficient method for distributing items when each buyer only demands one unit, domestic 
3 The particular Groves mechanism described by Lyon is: "Define R as the sum of the winning bids 
under the efficient assignment of rights to bidders. Define R j as the sum of winning bids if 
[bidder] i's bids are omitted from consideration. Define the extra value created by [bidder] i as 
Cj, where Cj=R-Rj. Let i's payment (Pj) equal the sum of i's winning bids (Bj) minus Cj. Where 
[bidder] i bids truthfully (as is its dominant strategy) its profit will equal Cj because the profit also 
equals Bj-Pj • (In the case of an auction for a single right this procedure implies that the right 
would be sold to the highest bidder for the price bid by the second highest bidder. Thus, in the 
single-right case this procedure is a second-price auction .... The mechanism is guaranteed to be 
incentive compatible, however, only if participants have additively separable preferences. The 
mechanism is also susceptible to manipulation by coalitions of bidders" (Lyon, 1982, p.19). 
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real estate auctions probably provide th~ best example of an appropriate case. This form 
of auction is unlikely to be adopted in private auctions, however, as the discriminating 
auction yields greater expected seller revenue when buyers are risk-averse. 
Auctions are commonly used to dispose of multiple units of homogeneous commodities 
in cases where each buyer may require more than one unit. The sale of government 
bonds provides an appropriate example. Efficient distribution involves the adoption of 
incentive-compatible demand revelation schemes. Use of such schemes results in lower 
revenue than first-rejected-bid auctions. 
The costs of efficiency losses incurred by adopting non-efficient auction techniques, and 
the costs to the seller of adopting efficient techniques, have not been measured. They 
cannot be predicted without information on buyer and seller preferences, their attitudes 
to risk-taking, and the amount of information each agent possesses about the likely 
actions of others. Given that auctions are generally adopted in cases of uncertainty or 
imperfect markets, this information is likely to be unavailable. 
5.10 Benefits of auctions 
The question remains as to why auctions are used. Typically, three major cases arise; 
(1) Urgent sales. Urgency may arise because of the perishable nature of the goods 
(fruit, vegetables, fish), or because of the need to realise a quick return for the 
vendor (e.g. liquidation sales) 
(2) Fairness of disposal. Typically this is an argument in disposal of public assets 
(surplus government stores, confiscated or stolen goods), creditor sales, and 
deceased estates 
(3) Demand uncertainty. When sellers have little information on demand an auction 
is commonly used to dispose of goods, or to set a market price. Examples include 
the sale of artworks and disposal of mineral leases. 
Auctions provide a convenient vehicle for urgent sales because price is immediately 
responsive to market demands. If a fixed price is set there is always the possibility that 
the good will sell out before demand is met, with the result that the vendor forgoes 
revenue, or that the vendor will set price too high and fail to dispose of all units. This 
may result in reduced revenue, but in the case of perishable items where the goods are 
59 
valueless unless sold immediately the opportunity for sale at a lower price at a later date· 
ensures the opportunity costs of making a sale are greater than for durable goods. 
Public auctions are an impersonal method of disposing of goods, the price being set by 
the bidders, and not by the agent disposing of the goods. This is an important reason 
why auctions are often preferred to negotiated sales. The agents responsible for disposal 
of the goods are not able to receive side payments from people offering to purchase at 
a low price, or to offer preferential treatment to buyers of their acquaintance. In this 
sense auctions are seen as fair, yielding 'market' prices for vendors and allowing all 
interested persons to participate. 
When demand is uncertain any allocation mechanism that relies on some predetermined 
pricing scheme provides the possibility that seller revenue will be less than could be 
obtained under conditions of certainty. Auctions provide a method for reducing 
uncertainty about market-clearing prices. This is especially true where individual items 
of uncertain (to the seller) value are to be distributed and there is enough demand to 
force the sale price to approximate the highest individual willingness to pay through 
either an English or a simultaneous auction. This conclusion also holds for multiple item 
auctions where each buyer may purchase only one unit. Although auctions in which 
individuals may purchase multiple units may not force prices to 'competitive market' 
levels, they are likely to entail less risk to the vendor since, in common with other auction 
types, they cause potential buyers to reveal some demand information. The threat of 
many competing buyers in the auction encourages potential buyers to reveal values higher 
than they would under a negotiable price arrangement. With sufficient potential buyers 
it is possible that bids may approach the maximum each individual would be willing to 
pay. 
5.11 Coupon and voucher rationing 
The resource distribution agency may choose to allocate the limited quantity of the 
commodity by coupon rationing. Normally, coupon rationing is put in place by 
governments to allocate scarce essential commodities fairly during times of crisis, such 
as following a natural disaster or during wartime. The sorts of resources typically 
controlled in this way include accommodation, clothing, food, and transport. The 
commodity may be provided directly by the rationing agency, or by independent agents 
who are usually able to charge for its provision. The former situation is the most 
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relevant to our purposes, since we are concerned with allocating an existing supply of 
goods already under control of the management agency. 
Two major types of coupon exist, those that entitle the bearer to obtain a given quantity 
of the good, but do not form part of the payment for the good,and those that provide 
both right of access and (part) payment. The former are termed ration coupons, while 
the later are termed vouchers. The implications of empL0ying ... c9upons and vouchers 
depend upon the method of their initial distribution and whether they are transferable 
or not. 
In summary, there are four main types of ration coupons available These are: 
(1) transferable coupons 
(2) non-transferable coupons 
(3) transferable vouchers 
(4) non-transferable vouchers. 
Each type of coupon may be initially allocated in a number of ways. They might be 
distributed free on merit, sold at fixed prices, auctioned, raffled, or handed out on a first-
come, first-served basis. 
5.11.1 Non-transferable coupons and vouchers 
Before it is possible to implement non-transferable rationing, it is necessary to have some 
method of identifying recipients of the service. This is similar to the problem faced in 
implementing price discrimination. Supply of utilities is therefor~ a suitable area for 
application of these methods. Supply of non-identifiable and easily transported 
commodities, such as food, is not as easily policed. While it may be possible to distribute 
vouchers or coupons to individuals, and only allocate the goods to those individuals upon 
presentation of suitable identification, trade in the commodity cannot be prevented. 
Friedman (1985) provides the example of company parking space allocation as a common 
application of voucher rationing. The user of the parking space is easily identified by the 
car registration number, so others can be prevented from obtaining access to the good. 
The allocation of parking spaces may be done on a variety of criteria. These might 
include some notion of merit (seniority in the company, or years of employment with the 
company), or a market device (competitive pricing or auction). 
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One may consider coupons and vouchers as identical except for the time of payment. 
For example, a voucher sold for a fixed price (say $X) is equivalent to a coupon that is 
given away, but that requires that the holder pay $X per unit to obtain the good. 
When the non-transferable voucher meets the full cost of the good (to the consumer) the 
method of rationing is equivalent to direct allocation of the good. The efficiency and 
distributional implications are directly determined by the initial allocation mechanism. 
For example, free, equal distribution will ensure lack of envy but is likely to be inefficient. 
Sale at a competitive price is likely to be efficient but is also likely to fail to meet 
distributional objectives. The impacts are identical to those discussed under each 
allocation method elsewhere in this publication. 
When the voucher must be supplemented by a cash payment, or coupons are used, the 
results are not as clear cut. The distributional and equity implications are determined 
by both the initial allocation method and the unit price (or other payment schedule) 
charged for the good. For example, if the coupons are sold in a competitive market the 
allocation will be efficient and the sale price of coupons will be the difference between 
the market clearing price for the good and the unit price in effect. Efficiency would also 
occur if the distributing agency could perfectly discriminate in the sale of coupons. 
However, if coupons are allocated free of charge in equal numbers the outcome will be 
inefficient, even though it may be considered very fair. This approach may also fail to 
allocate the full quantity available as some people will receive a number of coupons at 
which their marginal benefits are below the unit price. Consequently, more coupons than 
the available quantity of the good must be allocated. 
Non-transferable coupons are an effective means of redistributing wealth4• Figure 5.7 
illustrates the simple, two consumer case. Suppose the scarce good is allocated by 
competitive pricing. The price required to clear the market is Po, with the poor person 
consuming Qp and the rich person consuming Qr. Now suppose Qp + X non-transferable 
coupons are distributed to the poor person and Qr-X coupons to the rich. The aggregate 
4 An even more effective method is to allocate a cash grant to the target group. Economists have 
long argued that cash grants are a superior method of transferring wealth than are transfers in 
kind (see Friedman (1985, Chapter 3) for example). There may, however, be compelling reasons 
for insisting on support in kind, or assistance with purchasing particular goods. An oft-cited 
example is that of providing food, clothing, and education to underprivileged children. The 
parent(s) may choose to spend a cash grant on things that do not assist the child, or are 
detrimental to its welfare (e.g. drugs or alcohol),whereas non-transferable assistance in purchasing 
those items is more likely to result in an improvement in children's welfare. 
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demand curve now crosses the supply curve at a lower price (PI) to allow the market to 
clear. The distributor receives less income from sales ($[P o-P I]Q less) while the poor 
consumer obtains more consumer surplus, the change in surplus for the rich consumer 
is indeterminate, and is dependent upon the relative impacts of the change in price (area 
A) and the reduction in supply (area B). Overall, this reallocation scheme entails a loss 
in efficiency equal to area RST. 
If the individuals were given vouchers, instead of having to present coupons and pay, the 
same efficiency result holds, but there is a transfer of benefits from the distributor to the 
consumers. Under non-transferable schemes efficiency is determined by who gets the 
coupons or vouchers, and distributional impacts are determined largely by the payment 
mechanism in place. 
$ POOR RICH 
Supply 
Po 
Pi 
qr Q 
Dt' 
Figure 5.7 Non-transferable coupons. 
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5.11.2 Transferable coupons and vouchers 
The introduction of transferability of either coupons/vouchers or goods improves the 
efficiency of this class of allocation mechanisms. Suppose coupons are transferable, and 
are allocated as before (poor person receives Qp + X, rich person receives QR-X 
coupons). There is an incentive for the individuals to trade since, at the margin, the rich 
person is willing to pay more for a coupon than the poor person requires to compensate 
for the loss of a coupon. X coupons will be sold to the rich person at a total cost of 
between $C and $(B+G) for an efficiency gain equal to area RST in Figure 5.7. At 
equilibrium (with many people in the market) coupons will trade at the difference 
between the competitive price Po and the non-transferable price Pl' Ignoring income 
effects, the final allocation will be identical to that under a fixed, competitive price 
market5• 
The distribution of benefits will be determined by the pricing decision of the distributor. 
If price remains at PI consumer benefits equal area PI UVST and revenue is OP I TQt. 
The distribution of surplus between the consumers is dependent upon the final price at 
which the coupons were exchanged. The distributor may choose to raise the unit price 
as high as Po and still allocate all units. In this case consumer benefits equal area P oUVS 
and revenue equals area OP oSQt. If the distributor holds price at PI the consumers 
extract all the gains from trade, but by raising the price the distributor also obtains some 
of those gains. 
In Table 5.1, Figure 5.8 is used to summarise the impacts of a variety of coupon-rationing 
policies. 
The costs of assisting a target group are now evident. All three coupon-allocation 
schemes result in benefits to the target group (in this case the poor person). The 
transferable scheme at the low price maximises this group's benefits. If the additional 
allocation of coupons to the target group is large the transferable coupon scheme at the 
high price is more beneficial to the target group than non-transferable coupons. 
5 The real income of the poor person has been increased by enabling her/him to consume the 
rationed good at a lower price, leading to a higher level of welfare for that person. This increase 
in wealth causes the poor person's demand curve to move out from the origin. Consequently, at 
any price they will now consume more of each good then they did prior to the implementation 
of the rationing scheme. See Russell and Wilkinson (1979) for explanation. 
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Table 5.1: 
Outcome 
Poor person's 
benefits 
Rich person's 
benefits 
Total 
consumer 
benefits 
Revenue 
Total benefits 
Is it efficient? 
Impacts of a variety of coupon-rationing policies. 
Competitive sale 
of coupons 
area E 
area (P+B) 
area (E+P+B) = 
area PoUVS 
area OPoSQt 
= Po·Qt 
area OUVSQt ' 
Yes 
Non-transferable 
coupon allocation 
area (E+ D+C) 
area (P+A) 
area 
(E+D+C+P+A) 
= area P1UVRT 
area OP1TQt 
= P1·Qt 
area OUVRTQt 
No 
Transferable coupons at commodity price 
area (E+D+G) 
area (P+A+B) 
area 
(E+D+P+A+B+G) 
= area P1.Qt 
area OUVSQt 
area OUVRSQt 
Yes 
area (E+G) 
area (P + B-G) 
area (E+P+B) 
= area PoUVS 
area OPoSQt + 
Po·Qt 
area OUVSQt 
Yes 
The benefits accruing to the non-target group are determined by the elasticity of the 
target group's demand curve, since that determines the new selling price for the good. 
If target group demand is highly elastic the non-target group will obtain superior welfare 
after the imposition of the non-transferable coupon scheme. The costs under this scheme 
are borne completely by the vendor in this case, otherwise the non-target group 
subsidises target group consumption to some degree. 
When coupons are transferable at a low price (P 1) the non-target group unambiguously 
attains a welfare improvement relative to the free market situation. Both consumer 
groups obtain gains at the expense of the vendor. When coupons are transferable and 
the vendor sets a high price there is a transfer of welfare from non-target to target 
consumer groups. This transfer of welfare is Pareto optimal relative to the distribution 
after the coupons have been allocated. 
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Figure 5.8 Transferable coupon rationing. 
5.11.3 Summary 
Non-transferable voucher allocation is comparable to direct allocation of the good. Non-
transferable coupon allocation involves efficiency losses, but transfers welfare to the 
target group. The target group may be made even better-off, however, if members are 
able to trade coupons or vouchers. Transferability results in efficient allocation and, 
when the price of the rationed good can be controlled at a low level, all consumers 
become better-off than when goods are allocated competitively. 
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6 Comparison of methods 
6.1 Lottery and competitive pricing 
Figure 6.1 allows comparison of benefit measures under lottery and competitive pricing 
strategies (see Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1: Comparison of benefit measures under lottery and competitive pricing 
strategies. 
Benefit measure Allocation scheme Benefits Rank 
Competitive prices Pp·qo = area OP paqo 1 
Total Lottery PI·qo = area OPldqo 4 
benefits Entry fee lottery Pe·qo = area OP ebqo 2 
Success fee lottery Ps·qo = area OP scqo 3 
Competitive prices Po·qo = area OP oeqO 1 
Revenue Lottery zero 4 
Entry fee lottery P 4.q4 = p·qo = area Opjqo 2 
Success fee lottery P3·qo = area OP~qo 3 
Competitive prices (P p -P o).qo = area PoP pae 4 
Consumer Lottery P1·qo = area OP1dqo 1 
benefits Entry fee lottery (P e-p).qo = area pPebj 3 
Success fee lottery (Ps-P3).qo = area P 3P scg 2 
Notes: 
1. Since p.qo=P 4.q4' area Opjqo equals area OP lq4 
2. The consumer benefit rankings are derived by appeal to the fact that the average benefit curve is 
less steep than the marginal benefit curve, hence P p -Po < P 1-0, etc. 
Average benefits under pricing are P p' Under a pure lottery all people with marginal 
benefits from consumption greater than zero have an incentive to enter the lottery. 
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Figure 6.1 Compari son of benefi t measures. 
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These people have average benefits equal to Pl' Since PI is less than P p for any 
negatively sloping demand curve, the lottery is less efficient than competitive pricing. 
Lotteries that employ either entry or success fees rank between competitive pricing and 
the pure lottery on the efficiency criterion. For a given fee (P3 in Fig. 6.1) average 
benefits are Pe and Ps respectively. The entry fee is more efficient than the success fee. 
As the fees increase, total benefits increase until efficient allocations occur when fees are 
set equal to the competitive price. 
For these four allocation schemes the efficiency and revenue rankings are identical, and 
are the reverse of the consumer benefit rankings. Hence resource suppliers wishing to 
maximise profits will prefer the competitive pricing scheme to any of the lottery schemes, 
68 
while (risk-neutral) consumers would prefer a pure lottery that is inefficient, but that 
ensures consumers obtain all the benefits produced. 
6.2 Other mechanisms 
(i) Efficiency 
It is not possible to compare the efficiency rankings of merit, reservation, effort, queuing, 
non-Groves auctions, non-transferable coupons and vouchers, or second and third-degree 
price discrimination without specific demand and behavioural information. 
Preceding analysis identified competitive pricing, first-degree price discrimination, the 
Groves auction (in the absence of coalitions), and transferable coupons and vouchers as 
efficient allocation mechanisms. 
Although both competitive pricing and single-price revenue maximisation are efficient 
means of allocating their respective quantities, the increased quantity consumed under 
competitive pricing ensures that total benefits are greater under that mechanism. 
The efficiency ranking of single-price revenue maximisation and the lotteries depends 
upon the shape of the aggregate demand curve and the degree of rationing being 
imposed. Neither approach is universally more efficient. 
For example, take the linear demand schedule P=a+bQ, where a>O and b<O. Let the 
open access use level be Qo=-a/b, and the lottery rationed use level be Q2' 
Marginal revenue equals zero at Q1 =-a/(2b). This is the level of use of the resource 
under single-price revenue maximisation, yielding total benefits TBsprm: 
Under a pure lottery it is not possible to be certain of total benefits. Expected total 
benefits from a lottery are: 
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The two schemes will be equally as efficient when: 
= aQzl2 
-
= -3a/(4b) 
Further, we have: 
-a/(4b) > 0 
In other words, there is some quantity (Qz) between the open access and single-price 
revenue maximising quantities at which these two allocation schemes are of equal 
efficiency. At quantities less than Qz the lottery is less efficient, while at quantities above 
Qz it is more efficient, than single-price revenue maximisation. With the introduction of 
entry or success fees Qz will decrease. High enough fees will ensure the lottery is more 
efficient than single-price revenue maximisation. 
(ii) Revenue 
Several rankings are immediately apparent. No revenue is obtained from pure versions 
of: merit, queuing, vouchers, lottery, or advance registration. The monopoly-based 
methods for extracting consumers surplus are only adopted because they yield more 
revenue than competitive pricing. The better a monopolist is able to discriminate, the 
more revenue he or she may earn, therefore the revenue ranking of these methods is 
(where> means "generates more revenue than"): 
first-degree price discrimination> second-degree price discrimination> 
third-degree price discrimination> single-price revenue maximisation> 
competitive pricing. 
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Competitive pricing can generate more revenue than either entry or success fee lotteries, 
and the Groves auction procedure. It is unclear how other auction procedures rank 
against these methods, but in many instances it has been found that revenues are less 
than would have been generated by competitive markets. 
(iii) Consumer benefits 
We do not have enough information to rank consumer benefits under reservation, 
queuing, non-tradeable coupon and voucher, auction, or merit allocation mechanisms. 
While each of these methods is expected to be inefficient, consumer benefits may actually 
be greater than under some efficient allocation schemes because consumers do not have 
to pay (cash) for use of the resource. For example, reservation systems impose minimal 
costs on consumers, and while they may let 'inefficient' consumers obtain access to the 
resource, because those consumers do not have to pay for access in cash or time, total 
consumer benefits are likely to be greater than under, say, competitive pricing or 
queuing. 
For efficient schemes it is possible to draw upon the fact that total benefits equal the sum 
of consumer benefits and revenue to conclude that the consumer benefit ranking of these 
schemes will be reversed from the revenue-generation ranking. Hence we have the 
consumer benefit ranking (greatest to least consumer benefits) of: tradeable vouchers, 
Groves auction, competitive pricing and tradeable coupons, first-degree price 
discrimination. 
Because revenue generation from single-price revenue maximisation and second and 
third-degree price discrimination is greater than from competitive pricing, and because 
these methods are less efficient than competitive pricing, it is possible to conclude that 
each of these methods results in fewer consumer benefits than competitive pricing. On 
the other hand, because they are unable to capture all benefits, they do result in some 
surplus accruing to consumers, and so are preferential to first-degree price discrimination 
from the consumer's viewpoint. 
Comparison of consumer benefits between lottery and either competitive pricing or 
single-price revenue maximisation is not possible without information on the shape of the 
demand curve and the rationed quantity. For example, the lottery is always a better 
producer of consumer benefits than single-price revenue maximisation when the 
aggregate demand curve is linear. However, when the demand curve is initially very 
elastic but trails off into an inelastic 'tail' the lottery is inferior. Similarly, with a linear 
demand schedule, competitive pricing produces more consumer benefits than the lottery 
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when consumption is heavily rationed, but fewer consumer benefits when consumption 
is only lightly rationed. 
(iv) Consumer preferences 
Several studies have determined consumer preferences for resource allocation tools. 
These studies have primarily been completed to assist in allocating recreational 
opportunities, such as backpacking and river running, in cases of congestion or 
environmental degradation. McCool and Utter (1981, 1982) asked users of the Middle 
Fork of the Salmon River in Idaho to evaluate several rationing tools. Table 6.2 
indicates the percentages of consumer groups who rated each method as acceptable. 
Table 6.2: Percentages of consumer groups who rated various rationing techniques. 
Percentage rating "acceptable" 
Rationing technique Commercial users Private users Rejectees 
Lottery 57 80 92 
Knowledge and skill 66 56 51 
Advance reservation 84 54 32 
Priority for first time users 43 36 43 
Lottery-reservation 52 53 38 
Priority for Idahoans 21 23 17 
Advance reservation and lottery systems were the most acceptable to commercial and 
private users respectively, but, as McCool and Utter (1982) note: 
"These rankings indicate that each group ranks highest the rationing 
system with which it is most familiar. The second highest rating for all three 
groups was merit rationing. Giving priority to either first-time users or local 
residents was not favoured - in no group did more than half the 
respondents rate these two methods as acceptable" (p.ll). 
Private users who had recently been rejected by the lottery system still overwhelmingly 
favoured it. Part of this acceptance may be explained by the findings that over 40% of 
rejectees were able to run the river by joining other parties or waiting for cancellations. 
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Another 35% of rejectees ran alternative rivers. The importance of fairness in resource 
allocation is emphasised by the finding that Idahoans preferred the lottery system to a 
system that would give priority to residents of Idaho. 
McCool and Utter (1981) conclude: 
"It is important to recognize that there will be few settings where any 
allocation technique can be implemented in its pure form. In fact, it may 
be beneficial to have a mixture of allotment techniques on any given river 
so that the weaknesses of one technique are balanced by the strengths of 
another" (p.76). 
In a similar study, Shelby et at. (1982) surveyed Oregon river runners and backpackers 
to determine user preferences amongst pricing, reservation, lottery, queuing, and merit 
allocation systems. For each system, users were asked: (1) how they thought the system 
would affect their chances of getting a permit, (2) whether they thought it was a fair 
method for distributing permits, (3) whether the system was acceptable to them, and (4) 
whether they would try to obtain a permit by that method. Results are summarised in 
Table 6.3. 
Pricing and reservation systems are most favoured by all three user groups, because 
"these systems were seen as least detrimental to permit availability, fairest, most 
acceptable, and the largest percentages of users were willing to try them." (Shelby et al., 
1982: pA18). In accordance with the findings of McCool and Utter, this study found that 
river runners were strong supporters of reservation systems. "River runners were the 
strongest supporters of reservations, probably because they plan further in advance than 
hikers do and because this was the existing system on the Snake and, therefore, the most 
familiar .... River runners were more likely to rate lotteries as fair or acceptable and more 
willing to try them, probably because lotteries have been tried on other rivers .... River 
runners were less likely than backpackers to rate queuing as fair or acceptable and less 
willing to try it, probably because this option was felt to limit advance planning, to add 
risk to a long trip to the launch site with no substitutes if access were denied, and to 
diminish chances of getting permits." (ibid, pA18). 
It is interesting to observe that lotteries were the least acceptable mechanism for 
backpackers, who viewed the lottery system as having a strong impact on the chances of 
obtaining a permit and, more surprisingly, viewed it as unfair. River runners ranked 
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queuing and merit as less fair than lotteries, while pricing was perceived as intermediate 
in fairness between lotteries and reservations, reservations being the most preferred. In 
all cases pricing was judged superior to lottery, queuing, and merit systems. 
Table 6.3: Percentages of users agreeing with assessments of alternatives. 
Allocation alternative Hells Canyon Eagle Cap Mt Jefferson 
river runners backpackers backpackers 
Little or no elTect on chances of obtaining permits 
Pricing 48 70 54 
Reservation 64 56 45 
Lottery 31 20 19 
Queuing 14 41 38 
Merit 37 66 66 
System is fair 
Pricing 45 49 43 
Reservation 78 50 48 
Lottery 39 19 21 
Queuing 12 34 29 
Merit 23 24 34 
System is acceptable 
Pricing 66 66 55 
Reservation 95 73 74 
Lottery 50 28 30 
Queuing 25 50 51 
Merit 37 42 49 
Willing to try system 
Pricing 62 68 64 
Reservation 84 71 64 
Lottery 51 35 37 
Queuing 16 53 55 
Merit 36 56 6(} 
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In a survey of 2829 backpackers in Mt McKinley National Park (Alaska) Bultena, 
Albrecht, and Womble (1981) measured attitudes toward various rationing methods. The 
survey participants were strongly in support of rationing, with over 85% of respondents 
opposing use without rationing because of the physical and social impacts. Response 
percentages are shown in Table 6.4. 
Table 6.4: Response percentages for the rationing methods. 
Rationing method Support Neutral Oppose No response 
Queue 82 8 8 2 
Advance 37 14 46 3 
reservation 
Merit 26 21 49 4 
Pricing 11 18 68 3 
Lottery 6 15 76 3 
The most favoured mechanism amongst Mt McKinley backpackers was queuing, with 
moderate levels of support for advance reservations and merit, and little support for 
pricing or lotteries. The support for queuing is curious given the long distances many 
people travelled to the park, but is explained by the existence of a first-come, first-served 
permit allocation system. 
New Zealand hunters, who generally favoured rationing use to increase deer numbers, 
were surveyed to determine preferred rationing methods by Nugent and Mawhinney 
(1987). The preferences for the sample of 335 hunters were: 
Permit reduction34% 
1-2 year c1osure25% 
Stags only23 % 
Difficult access 9% 
Feesl% 
Other 8% 
Hunters showed a strong dislike of fees and of difficulty of access. This is understandable 
when it is considered that in either case the additional surplus realised from increased 
kill rates is dispersed for most hunters, either as cash or as sweat. The more favoured 
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options return all the benefits of the rationing to the hunters, except under the stag-only 
option where trophy hunters undoubtedly benefit, but meat hunters do not necessarily. 
In accordance with Groome et al. (1983), Nugent and Mawhinney (1987) found that 
hunters preferred the resource allocation method that was already in place and that they 
were familiar with. These findings concur with those of the North American researchers 
reviewed earlier (Bultena et al., 1981; McCool and Utter, 1982; Shelby et al., 1982). 
The foregoing studies illustrate that it is not possible to predict consumer acceptability 
of rationing methods from a theoretical analysis of the distribution of benefits. Choices 
are not uniform across or within activities. For example, Mt McKinley backpackers 
showed strong opposition to pricing, while Eagle Cap and Mt Jefferson backpackers 
found the system acceptable and were willing to try it. 
People tend to favour rationing systems that they are familiar with from previous 
experience. It is likely that notions of fairness influence consumer choices of allocation 
techniques, and it does not necessarily follow that because (say) pricing delivers fewer 
consumer benefits than a lottery or advance reservations that it will be a less favoured 
mechanism. Further, there is the issue of uncertainty and risk. Under pricing and 
advance reservation mechanisms consumers can be certain of access and its cost, or can 
insure themselves from being precluded access. Risk-averse individuals will therefore 
discount the costs imposed by these methods to some degree. 
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7 Choice of an allocation mechanism 
Zl Management objectives 
This report does not address the choice of objectives, it endeavours only to look at 
various methods for achieving some objectives, and to analyse the sorts of impacts 
expected. However, it is apparent that resource managers are influenced by many 
factors. Some of these will bear upon the actions of managers by restricting choices, or 
by the provision of incentives to act in particular ways. These factors may cause the 
agency to act in some 'socially non-optimal' way when judged against a different set of 
criteria. Some of the more important factors are now summarised as a list of questions 
that the agency may pose itself before choosing a strategy. 
(1) What information is available? 
(2) Who owns or has rights to the resource? 
(3) What legal constraints exist? 
(4) What political constraints exist? 
(5) Do resource recipients have opportunities to re-sell or trade in the resource? 
(6) Who bears the management costs? 
(7) Who obtains the resource rents? 
(8) How will managerial performance be judged and rewarded? 
(9) Are there any target groups that should obtain preferential access to the resource? 
(10) Are there other objectives? 
The responses to questions 1-6 are primarily important for determining what tools are 
available to the manager, although they may also influence objectives, while questions 7-
10 are primarily influential in determining management objectives. 
7.1.1 Factors primarily influencing option availability 
(i) What information is available? 
A major factor limiting the range of tools at the management agency's disposal is the 
amount of information available about consumer demand for the rationed good. This 
is not a major problem for non-market tools. No demand information is needed to 
implement lottery, queuing, or reservation systems. However, when a resource is to be 
allocated using effort or merit rationing the management agency must be aware of total 
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demand for the good, in terms of effort or ability to meet the merit requirements, before 
being able to set a standard that will produce the required level of consumption. These 
levels could, of course, eventually be found by trial and error. 
Market tools are more information-sensitive. The only market tools that are applicable 
without any demand information are auction mechanisms and coupon/voucher rationing. 
Some market techniques require information on aggregate demand only. For example, 
competitive prices and uniform revenue-maximising prices can be determined from this 
information. Pricing techniques that have superior revenue-earning abilities require more 
information. Demand functions for sub-groups are necessary to allow implementation 
of second- and third-degree price discrimination and reallocation via coupons and 
vouchers, while individual demand functions are needed for perfect price discrimination. 
Information requirements are shown in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Information requirements of various market and non-market tools. 
Demand information available Non-market 
None Lotteries 
Queues 
Reservations 
Aggregate demand Above plus, 
Effort 
Merit 
Aggregated demand for sub-groups All above 
Individual demand All above 
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Applicable tools 
Market 
Auctions 
Coupons 
Vouchers 
Above plus, 
Competitive pricing 
Revenue-maximising pricing 
Lotteries with fees 
Above plus, 
Block tarrifs 
Two-part tariffs 
Third-degree price discrimination 
Above plus, 
Perfect price discrimination 
These information requirements represent a constraint upon the choices available to the 
resource distributing agency. However, even when there is little information available 
the agency retains a long list of options for resource allocation, and hence retains the 
ability to influence the distribution of welfare. 
(ii) Who owns the resource? 
This publication has dealt exclusively with new allocations. At the outset we used the 
assumption that the allocating agency had secure rights to the resources being distributed. 
This assumption clearly does not always hold. It is commonly violated in cases where 
rights have been ceded in perpetuity, or in some long-term arrangement, and becomes 
important when it is desired to reallocate or reduce the total allocation of the good. 
Increases in the allocation do not pose a problem, since they may be treated as new 
allocations. 
Examples of areas in which long-term rights arrangements have been, or are likely to be, 
altered include pastoral leases, water rights, and individual transferable quotas for marine 
fish. In such cases the resource allocation agency has two major options, it may (i) 
convince right holders to freely renounce or transfer their rights through trade or 
persuasion, or (ii) obtain the rights through coercion, which may require special 
legislation. The management agency may not have the financial resources to obtain the 
rights it is seeking, leading it towards compulsory acquisition policies where these are 
legally and politically viable. 
The first course of action poses no particular problem. Because actions are undertaken 
voluntarily they comply with requirements for procedural justice and efficiency. They 
may have some negative outcome equity impacts, however. Coercion poses problems in 
the realm of procedural justice, and may be inefficient. Since some individuals are forced 
into actions against their will, this approach will often be judged to be unfair. The 
desirability of such a course of action depends upon the reason( s) for wanting the 
reallocation in the first place. These may be concerns for efficiency, outcome equity 
(including intergenerational equity), environmental, or other matters. The desirability of 
compromising procedural justice criteria can only be judged against the desirability of 
meeting the criteria motivating the proposed change. 
(iii) What legal constraints exist? 
The resource manager may not have freedom to choose management objectives, but may 
be required to allocate the resource according to some legally defined procedure, or to 
meet some objective defined in legislation. Many Acts of Parliament determine who has 
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access to resources, how those resources may be used, how much can be allocated to one 
person, whether the resource may be traded, and what trading practices may be 
employed. For example, the National Parks Act 1980 outlines situations in which access 
to national parks may be controlled and limits the control mechanisms available to 
managers by stipulating that access must be free. 
Further constraints exist in legislation designed to limit the range of allocation procedures 
available to anyone. The most relevant New Zealand legislation is the Commerce Act 
1986, which primarily limits actions that increase market power, and therefore the ability 
to apply discriminatory pricing practices. Section 36 of the Commerce Act places 
restrictions on use of market dominance, but does not, per se, preclude any of the 
allocation practices discussed here. 
(iv) What political constraints exist? 
While a manager may possess sufficient information to implement particular allocation 
schemes, and have the legal ability to do so, some schemes may still be judged politically 
undesirable. While this is an especially important factor for elected managers, it can also 
act as a constraint on appointed officials. 
(v) Opportunities for re-sale 
Our review of the implications of coupons and vouchers highlighted the implications of 
the ability to re-sell rationed resources, or access to them. In general, the ability to re-
sell results in Pareto improvements in welfare. This conclusion does not necessarily hold 
in the instances where (1) the recipients do not have full information on the merits of the 
good to them, (2) externalities exist, or (3) the recipient does not have the ability to 
retain their rights to the good. Examples of these cases would be: resale of medical aid 
when the recipients of that aid do not understand the nature of the disease they are 
exposed to, wartime trade in foodstuffs required for health and high productivity, and 
parental sale or use of assistance allocated to children. Inability to prevent black markets 
(or unwillingness to preclude white markets) may result in unwanted redistribution of 
benefits which can prevent desired outcomes from occurring. The presence of middle-
people may present a false picture of the existence of any externalities associated with 
final uses of the resource. 
(vi) Who bears the management costs? 
This question is central to choice of management strategy, especially in times of budget 
restraints. When a management agency has to cover management costs from 'user pays' 
systems it will be forced to adopt some form of market allocation mechanism. If 
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management costs are high, efficient allocation mechanisms may be precluded because 
of their inability to meet revenue requirements. This publication has not addressed the 
issue of management costs closely, but they are clearly a central element in the overall 
efficiency and distributional impacts of any allocation scheme. 
(vii) Who bears the risk? 
Risk and uncertainty are common in dealings associated with natural resources. Sources 
of risk and uncertainty are manifold, including lack of knowledge about demand for raw 
materials and final products, the quantity and quality of the resource, the costs of 
resource extnlction, weather conditions, and so on. Different rationing schemes result 
in different ris~ allocations. Some place the risk on the seller/distributor, some on the 
user, and some on the resource. These differences arise from the type of risk as well as 
the ability to reallocate demand. For example, suppose there is a r~sk of supply shortfalls 
(e.g. in water allocations during a drought). Unless there is some contingency plan for 
reallocations, lotteries and advance reservations that occurred before the shortfall was 
apparent will result in the need for a revised rationing regime. Failure to implement a 
new scheme may result in unwanted environmental impacts (e.g. fish deaths if too much 
water is withdrawn) or user conflict when supply fails to meet allocateddemand. On the 
other hand, daily sales, whether by auction, competitive, or discriminatory sale, do not 
result in these problems. However, discriminatory, monopolistic, and competitive pricing 
is not well suited to conditions where demand varies greatly. A competitive price one 
day may result in either excess or insufficient demand on other days. 
7.1.2 Factors primarily important in determining manager objectives 
In the public sector the basic objectives for managers are determined to a large extent 
by legislation and/or government directive, however, other factors also influence the ways 
in which managers act. 
(i) Who obtains the resource rents? 
Distribution of rents will act as an influence in determining manager objectives. In cases 
where managers (or their agencies) retain rights over rents there is a wider range of 
possible objectives, and a greater probability of market allocation mechanisms being 
adopted. Ability to retain rents enables managers to pursue objectives such as profit 
maximisation, revenue maximisation, subsidisation of other activities, and so on. 
(ii) How will managerial performance be judged and rewarded? 
This may be the most important issue affecting management of resources. Managerial 
performance may be judged on profits earned, popularity of agency actions, number of 
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people served, number of people employed, revenue generated, costs incurred, or any 
combination of these and other criteria. Managers may be compensated for their efforts 
with a fixed salary, status, publicity, profit shares, or bonuses. The interaction of 
judgement. and reward mechanisms, along with the manager's personality may largely 
influence Jhe type of actions implemented. 
(iii) Target groups 
Many resource allocation agencies are given resources to assist particular groups or 
interests. Examples include: Department of Social Welfare, Intellectually Handicapper 
Children, Crippled Childrens' Society, Department of Maori Affairs, Ministry ofWomens' 
Affairs, and Department of Conservation. Other agencies, such as regional and territorial 
authorities, have greater freedom to choose their own target groups, although these 
agencies may still be required by national government policy directives to target specific 
groups. 
(iv) Other objectives 
This publication has measured efficiency strictly in terms of willingness to pay. By doing 
so we have precluded any distortionary effects caused by externalities. Clearly there are 
some cases where end uses may have external effects that influence efficiency of resource 
use, even though they do not influence the end user's willingness to pay. Oft-cited cases 
include differential flow-on and employment creation effects of alternative end uses. 
These impacts may be the sole justification for selection of particular resource allocation 
strategies. Clearly, external effects can also have strong re-distributional impacts as costs 
and benefits are bestowed upon people outside the direct resource allocation process. 
7.2 Mechanisms for particular objectives 
7.2.1 Efficiency 
When operated perfectly~ several tools result in efficient resource allocations. Those 
tools are: 
(1) competitive pricing; 
(2) perfect price discrimination; 
(3) single unit, English auctions; 
( 4) simultaneous, n'+ 1st price auctions; 
(5) Groves auctions; 
(6) saleable coupons·and vouchers. 
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It is not possible to derive a complete ranking of the efficiency of other tools without 
information on the aggregate demand function. It must be stressed that although these 
allocation techniques are all efficient, they do not result in identical outcomes. For 
example, saleable coupons and vouchers confer windfall gains 011 those to whom the 
coupons or vouchers are initially distributed. A Pareto optimal-result will be achieved 
relative to this distribution of welfare after trade in the coupons or vouchers. Total 
benefits will, in general, differ from total benefits obtained under the other efficient 
allocation systems. A choice amongst the set of Pareto efficient outcomes can only be 
made with reference to the social welfare function - in other words, by comparison of 
distributional impacts. 
7.2.2 Revenue generation 
Merit and effort are two allocation tools that never produce any revenue for the 
administering agency (unless the agency charges fees above average cost to sit 
'prbficiency tests', or determines merit by value of 'donations' to the agency). In their 
pure forms lotteries, queues, advance reservations, and vouchers produce no revenue. 
Allocation systems that are self-funding, or that are designed to earn profits, will never 
employ any of these tools in their pure forms. Revenue-earning tools may be ranked 
according to their ability to generate funds for the resource administering agency. 
Impure forms of non-revenue-generating tools produce less revenue than the revenue 
generating tool that creates the impurity. For example, if a queue is used in conjunction 
with competitive pricing the market clearing price will be lower than pure competitive 
pricing since some people who are willing to pay higher prices are eliminated by the 
queue. This occurs because the market has already been reduced by the presence of the 
non-revenue-generating tool, and because that reduction will not generally eliminate from 
the market only those willing to pay the lowest dollar amounts. 
No revenue 
... 
Lotteries/queues/advance reservations/vouchers/merit/effort 
Little revenue Auctions/non-transferable coupons 
... Competitive pricing/transferable coupons 
... Single-price revenue maximisation 
... Third-degree price discrimination 
... Second-degree price discrimination 
Most revenue Perfect price discrimination 
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7.2.3 Consumer benefits 
Consumers receive no benefits under perfect price discrimination, however if perfect 
discrimination is employed without pricing [a form of merit allocation] consumers (in 
aggregate) receive maximum benefits. 
When a fixed quantity is to be allocated it is possible to rank consumer benefits from 
some market allocation procedures and the lottery. Without knowledge of the 
distribution of the costs associated with non-market allocation mechanisms it is not 
possible to rank the consumer benefits of these methods. 
No consumer benefits 
+ 
Few consumer benefits 
+ 
Perfect price discrimination 
Second-degree price discrimination 
Third-degree price discrimination-Single-price revenue 
maximisation 
+ Competitive pricing-Single unit English auction 
Most consumer benefits Lottery-Groves auction 
Because the Groves auction is efficient, but individuals face lower costs than competitive 
pricing, the Groves auction bestows more consumer benefits than competitive pricing. 
While both the lottery and the Groves auction bestow more consumer benefits than 
competitive pricing, there is no way to tell a priori which results in greater consumer 
benefits. This problem also exists with competitive pricing and single-unit English 
auctions, which are expected to provide approximately equal consumer benefits. This 
form of equivalence is denoted by - above. 
7.2.4 Summary 
It is now possible to determine a partial ranking for most allocation schemes according 
to the criteria of efficiency, revenue, and consumer benefits. 
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Table 7.2: Ranking for allocation schemes. 
Max. 
1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
~ 
Min. 
* 
1 
2 
Efficiency Revenue Consumer benefits 
Competitive pricing, First-degree price discrim. 
Groves auction, Second-degree price discrim. on-transferable vouchers, 
Transferable vouchers, Third-degree price discrim. Merit, Reservations, 
Transferable coupons, Single-price revenue max. Auctions, Queues, Lottery, 
First-degree price discrim. ICompetitive pricing, Non-transferable coupons. 
Transferable coupons. Competitive pricing, 
~uctions, Lottery, Merit, Transferable coupons, 
Queues, Reservations, ~on-~ransferable coupons Transferable vouchers. 
Single-price revenue max., ucttons 
Non-transferable coupons, Single-price revenue max. 
Non·transferable vouchers, Third-degree price discrim. 
Second-degree price discrim., Second-degree price discrim. 
Third-degree price discrim. 
*1 Queues, Reservations, *First-degree price discrim. 
Merit, Vouchers, Lottery 
Benefit measure equals zero 
Solid lines indicate methods producing identical benefits 
Arrowed lines indicate groups of methods which are not directly comparable on the benefit 
criterion. The arrows indicate the likely range within which the ranks are likely to fall. Order 
within the group is irrelevant. 
7.2.5 Distributional implications 
Inability to measure equity or fairness ensures that ranking allocation tools with respect 
to distributional matters can never be a simple task. The best that can be done is to 
indicate which groups do (or do not) obtain the good and who pays for the good when 
different allocation tools are used (Table 7.3). 
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Table 7.3: 
Tool 
Merit 
Effort 
Lottery 
Queue 
Advance reservation 
Coupons (i) non-tradeable 
(ii) tradeable 
Vouchers (i) non-tradeable 
(Ii) tradeable 
Competitive pricing 
Monopolistic pricing 
1st degree price discrim. 
2nd degree price discrim. 
3rd degree price discrim. 
Groves auction 
Other auctions 
Groups obtaining and paying for the good when different 
allocation tools are used. 
Group favoured Group paying 
Target group Resource owners 
Physically fit and skilled Resource owners 
Advance planners Resource owners 
Low value on time Resource owners 
Longer planning horizons Resource owners 
Target group Resource owners 
Target group/those willing and able to pay Resource 
Rent receivers owners/users 
Target group Resource owners 
Target group/those willing and able to pay Resource 
Rent receivers owners/users 
Those willing and able to pay!Rent receivers Resource users 
Those willing and able to pay!Rent receivers Resource users 
Rent receivers Resource users 
Those willing and able to pay!Rent receivers Resource users 
Those willing and able to pay!Rentreceivers Resource users 
Those willing and able to pay!Rent receivers Resource 
owners/users? 
Those willing and able to pay!Rent receivers Resource users 
The favoured group column identifies the groups receiving benefits from the allocation 
method. Most market allocation methods bestow benefits upon 'those willing and able 
to pay' and 'rent receivers'. The former category refers to the consumer surplus benefits 
obtained by users~ but is cognisant of the reality that desire to consume is constrained by 
ability to pay the market price. The second category recognises that these allocation 
methods bestow rents whenever revenue is greater than cost of supply. Therefore, 
whenever profit is earned, rent receivers are favoured in that they obtain profits. 
The group paying column indicates who pays for provision of the goods. Under market 
allocation methods this is generally the resource user, while for non-market allocation 
methods it is generally the resource owner (Le. the Crown, the taxpayer, or residents of 
the region). This occurs because there is no means of directly compensating the resource 
owner for supply of the good. Any costs of provision are therefore borne by the resource 
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owners. In cases of positive externalities the resource owners may be compensated via 
the external effects. Examples arise in taxpayer-funded health expenditures and provision 
of recreational facilities. 
There are questions associated with costs and benefits of the Groves auction mechanism 
because the revenue generated by this system is low compared with other market 
mechanisms, implying that it may not be possible to cover supply costs and that resource 
owners subsidise the users. Because payments are not directly related to bids under this 
allocation procedure, ability to pay is less of a constraint than under other market 
methods, especially when demand is elastic. 
Z3 Case study 
To help indicate the sorts of impacts that result from application of some of the different 
allocation mechanisms we will now proceed to an example. There are 20 units of a 
resource to be allocated between two groups, a rich group and a poor group. There are 
equal numbers of identical individuals in each group. It is possible to deal with individual 
allocations, but for simplicity we will deal with group aggregates in most instances. If one 
wishes to determine the allocation to any individual it is a simple matter of dividing 
aggregate allocations by the number in the group. Prices are identical for all members 
of a group. To simplify analysis we assume that the good is infinitely divisible, allowing 
us to deal in fractions of -units. This would be the case if we thought of each unit of the 
resource as, say, one million cubic metres of gravel. 
The demand and inverse demand functions for each group are: 
. Rich group: 
Poor group: 
X R = 25-pj4 
Xp = 12-p/5 
=* p = 100-4XR 
=* P = 60-5Xp 
The aggregate demand function is then: 
x = 25-p/4 100;::p;::60 
and 
x = 37-9p/30 60;::p;::0 
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The outcomes are presented in Table 7A. The mathematical derivation of the outcomes 
is not presented here, readers are left to verify these for themselves. The example 
should indicate, however, the range of distributional outcomes attainable and the 
efficiency costs of obtaining some outcomes (ignoring transaction costs). While total 
benefits do not vary greatly for this example, this small variance should not be accepted 
as typical. The variance in total benefits (and distribution of benefits) is a function of the 
nature of the demand curves. 
Table 7.4: Outcomes of allocation methods in a hypothetical case study. 
Quantities 
Strategy Rich Poor Consumers surplus Revenue Total 
benefits 
Competitive pricing 15.56 4.44 484 49 533 756 1289 
Monopolist pricing 14.72 3.78 433 36 469 760 1230-
Perfect discrimination 15.56 4.44 0 0 0 1289 1289 
Third-degree discrimination 13.51 6.49 365 105 470 800 1270-
TWo-part tariff (disc.) 15.56 4.44 0 0 0 1289 1289 
TWo-part tariff (non-disc.) 20.00 0.00 0 0 0 1200 1200 
Block tariff (all in) 15.56 4.44 460 25 485 804 1289 
Block tariff (exclusion) 20.00 0.00 400 0 400 800 1200 
Lottery 13.51 6.49 675 195 870 0 870 
Vouchers (non-trans.) 10.00 10.00 700 250 950 200 1150 
Vouchers (transferable) 15.56 4.44 862 427 1289 0 1289 
Coupons. (non-trans.) 10.00 10.00 700 250 950 200 1150 
Coupons (transferable) 15.56 4.44 330 204 533 756 1289 
Groves auction 15.56 4.44 929 89 1018 271 1289 
Notes: 
1. Monopolist pricing is single price revenue maximisation. 
2. TWo-part tariff (disc) is the variant allowing discrimination in entrance fees, while two-part tariff 
(non-disc) does not allow discrimination on entrance fees. 
3. Block tariff (all in) has the block prices set so that no individual is excluded from the market, 
whereas Block tariff (exclusion) does not include this restriction. 
4. The consumer surplus estimates for transferable coupons and vouchers- are based upon an 
assumption of competitive trading. There may be some transfer of surplus between groups 
according to the actual prices infra-marginal units are sold at. The transferable coupon example 
assumes that the vendor of the good increases prices to extract consumer surplus after all coupons 
have been transferred to the highest valuing consumers. 
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It is not possible to include all of the non-market allocation schemes in this analysis. For 
example, we have no information on the distribution of the costs of queuing, or the 
distribution of ability to meet merit requirements,plan in advance, or supply effort. 
This example highlights some interesting outcomes. Many different schemes are efficient 
(all schemes with total benefits of $1289 are efficient in this case). Given the 
homogeneity within user groups and our perfect demand information, the discriminatory 
two-part tariff and the non-exclusive block tariff techniques appear efficient. In real 
applications these methods are unlikely to be efficient since groups are not homogeneous. 
In other words, not all 'rich people' have identical demand functions, although they may 
be similar and distinctly different from those of 'poor people'. 
Several approach~s eliminate all benefits to some agents. The resource distributor 
obtains no revenue if a pure lottery or pure vouchers are used, while consumers obtain 
no benefits under perfect discrimination and two-part tariffs when these are applied 
perfectly. The pricing schemes adopted by monopolists to increase their profits (revenue 
in this case) relative to the competitive pricing case range from monopolist pricing 
through exclusive block tariffs. These schemes all result in -a reduction of benefits to 
consumers, in some cases eliminating all benefits to specific groups, although third-degree 
price discrimination actually results in an improvement of welfare for poor people. 
Those tools that are primarily designed to be used as consumer welfare instruments 
(coupons, vouchers) result in reduced income for the distributing agency. Transferability 
of vouchers improves the welfare of all consumers, resulting in an efficient allocation of 
resources. The outcome under transferable coupons is determined to a large extent by 
the actions of the resource distributing agency. Mter the coupons have been transferred 
the distributor has the option of increasing prices to obtain access to the gains from 
trade. This results in an efficient allocation, with aggregate consumers' surplus being 
identical to the competitive market case, There is, however, a shift in the distribution of 
that consumers' surplus from rich people to poor people. All of these 'redistributive' 
tools result in dramatic increases in the welfare of the poor group. 
There is no dominant tool. A gain in one area implies a loss in some other area. Some 
tools do dominate others, however. For example, the exclusive block tariff is dominated 
by the non-exclusive block tariff in this case. This finding will not always hold. The 
lottery is dominated by non-transferable coupons and both types of voucher. This finding 
only occurs because of the specific (equal) distribution of vouchers and coupons in this 
example. The discriminatory two-part tariff dominates the non-discriminating alternative. 
89 
If the distributing agency is seeking to maximise profits it will use one of the 
discriminatory pricing schemes. Only if the distributor has perfect demand information 
will these schemes be efficient, and then consumers will not obtain any benefits. 
Consumers clearly prefer the voucher, coupon, and lottery options. The Groves auction 
is preferred by all consumers to the competitive pricing strategy, although it places 
greater costs on consumers who must consider their full demand functions rather than 
simply concentrate on the margins as they are able to do under competitive pricing. 
7.4 Conclusions 
Choice of an optimal resource allocation mechanism is a complex matter. An agency can 
choose from only a sub-set of tools because of practical, legal, and political constraints 
over which it may have no control. The agency is then required to choose a tool· from 
a set of tools; these tools differ immensely in their performance on several major 
evaluative criteria. Making a choice involves a decision on the relative rankings of these 
criteria and the WIllingness to sacrifice performance on anyone to obtain improvements 
on any other(s). Selection of a tool therefore indicates the agency's objectives to some 
extent when the staff of the agency understand the impacts of the set of tools. 
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